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ABSTRACT

We consider the design of a tax on greenhouse gas emissions for a developed
country such as the United States. We consider three sets of issues: the optimal
tax base, issues relating to the rate (including the use of the revenues and rate
changes over time) and trade. We show that a well-designed carbon tax can
capture about 80% of U.S. emissions by taxing fewer than 3,000 taxpayers and up
to almost 90% with a modest additional cost. We recommend full or partial
delegation of rate setting authority to an agency to ensure that rates reflect new
information about the costs of carbon emissions and of abatement. Adjustments
should be made to the income tax to ensure that a carbon tax is revenue neutral
and distributionally neutral. Finally, we propose an origin-based system for trade
with countries that have an adequate carbon tax and a system of border taxes for
imports from countries without a carbon tax. We suggest a system that imposes
presumptive border tax adjustments with the ability of an individual firm to prove
that a different rate should apply. The presumptive tax could be based either on
average emissions for production of the item by the exporting country or by the
importing country.
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The Design of a Carbon Tax
Gilbert Metcalf and David Weisbach
January 2009
This paper considers the design of a tax on greenhouse gases. The
purpose of such a tax, which we will generally refer to as a carbon tax, is to
internalize externalities associated with anthropogenic climate change.1 Without
a carbon tax, individuals face a distorted set of prices. Activities that result in
carbon emissions are relatively too cheap because individuals will not consider
the costs the emissions impose on others, including on future generations. A tax
forces individuals to consider the full set of consequences from emissions.
The theory behind these sorts of taxes dates back to writings by Pigou, 70
years ago, but there is little experience with the design of these taxes and almost
none with a Pigouvian tax that covers a substantial portion of the economy, as
would a carbon tax.2 There are several existing carbon taxes but all are
comparatively narrow or are otherwise badly designed. There have also been
several proposed carbon taxes introduced into legislation in the U.S., but only in
bare bones form. Although we can learn from these examples, they do not serve
as adequate models for the best possible design of a carbon tax.
We consider three central design issues: the tax base (including possible
offsets or credits), the tax rate (including distributional issues, the use of the
revenues, and tax rate changes), and trade. With respect to the base, we show that
by collecting the tax upstream, we can accurately and cheaply cover 80 percent of
U.S. emissions by taxing fewer than 3,000 taxpayers, and that we can cover close
1

As we will discuss below, there are a wide variety of greenhouse gases other than carbon. See
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007): "Climate Change 2007 -- the Physical
Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC,"
Cambridge University Press. p. 33 for a list of greenhouse gases. We refer to the tax generically
as a carbon tax with the understanding that it will likely cover a wide variety of greenhouse gases.
We will not discuss the science behind anthropogenic climate change. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007): "Climate Change 2007 -- the Physical Science Basis,
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC," Cambridge
University Press. for a review of the science.
2

PIGOU, A. C. (1938): The Economics of Welfare. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. For a
review of the theory behind these taxes, see BOVENBERG, A. L., and L. H. GOULDER (2002):
"Environmental Taxation and Regulation," Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier Science. There are
a number of papers that consider design issues from a general perspective, such as how to set the
tax when there are administrative costs of collection. See, for example, POLINSKY, A. M., and S.
SHAVELL (1982): "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs," Journal of Public Economics,
19, 385-394.
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to 90 percent of U.S. emissions at a modest additional cost. As the base gets
broader, the collection costs increase, and the tradeoff between the increased
collection costs and the benefits of a broader base determine the optimal tax base.
The main problem presented by upstream collection is that a tax credit or offset
must be given for fossil fuels that are not combusted. For example, if a tax is
imposed at the refinery and some distillates are sequestered into products such as
asphalt, the tax will be too broad. We discuss how such a credit system would be
designed.
Although the theory behind setting the rate is well known – it should equal
the marginal harm from emissions – there are a number of difficult design issues.3
The most difficult issue with respect to rates is the design of a system for ensuring
that the rate changes over time as we learn new information about the costs and
benefits of reducing emissions. In particular, a central problem with climate
change is uncertainty about the effects and uncertainty about the costs of
abatement. The best that can be done now is a crude estimate of the optimal rate.
As we learn new information, the tax rate will have to change to reflect this. We
suggest a delegation or partial delegation of rate setting authority to an expert
agency to ensure that rate changes at appropriate intervals are on the agenda and
expertise in the relevant parameters for setting the rate. Given the size of the tax
and the potential winners and losers from rate changes, full delegation may not be
possible, in which case we recommend a number of intermediate regimes. We
also discuss the use of the revenues, recommending a revenue neutral and
distributionally neutral adjustment to the income or payroll taxes.
The third design issue relates to trade in carbon intensive goods. We
argue that border tax adjustments for a carbon tax are necessary and appropriate.
There is, however, no simple and clearly legal method of implementing a system
of border tax adjustments to prevent so-called carbon leakage, the shifting of
production to countries without a carbon pricing mechanism. The key problem is
that to set the border tax adjustment, we need information about the particular
production technology and sources of energy used to produce an item, unlike with
a VAT, where price is all that is needed. The necessary information may be
difficult to obtain. We consider a number of possible options and their legality,
recommending a system of presumptive border tax adjustments that allow
individual firms to provide evidence of lower emissions. The presumptive border
tax can be based on either average emissions from the production of like products
in the exporting country or in the importing country. Using information from the
3

The optimal tax rate in a second-best world is a bit more complicated. We discuss this further
below.
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exporting country is preferable but obtaining that information may be more
difficult and using it raises additional trade-related legal issues.
Cap and trade systems are currently the favored carbon-pricing
mechanism. The EU uses a cap and trade system for compliance with the Kyoto
Protocol and cap and trade systems are prominently under consideration in the
U.S. Congress. Although there are many reasons for preferring a tax,4 if a cap
and trade system is ultimately adopted, most of the design issues for the tax will
be relevant for a cap and trade system. For example, it is likely that we will want
to use the same point in production for remittance of a tax and for the imposition
of a permit requirement. Similarly, carbon leakage raises similar issues under a
cap and trade regime and under a tax. Thus, a detailed consideration of how to
implement a carbon tax can inform the discussion of how best to implement a cap
and trade system should a cap and trade system end up being chosen as the carbon
pricing mechanism.5
Our focus here is on a tax implemented in a developed country. We have
the U.S. in mind, and use U.S. data, but the considerations may be similar in other
developed countries even if some particulars change. Other issues may arise in
developing countries, where, for example, tax enforcement is not as robust and
4

The literature is large. For a small sample, see WEITZMAN, M. (1974): "Prices Vs. Quantities,"
Review of Economic Studies, 41, 477-491., ROBERTS, M. J., and M. SPENCE (1976): "Effluent
Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, 5, 193-208., HOEL, M.,
and L. KARP (2002): "Taxes Versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant," Resource and Energy
Economics, 24, 367-384., KARP, L., and J. ZHANG (2005): "Regulation of Stock Externalities with
Correlated Abatement Costs," Environmental and Resource Economics, 32, 273-299., NORDHAUS,
W. D. (2007): "To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming,"
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 1, 26-44. Most of these discussions focus on
theoretical issues such as the deadweight loss from error. We note that from an administrative
perspective a carbon tax can be more quickly implemented than a cap and trade system. Coal
producers already pay an excise tax to fund the Black Lung Trust Fund and oil producers pay a tax
to fund the Oil Spill Trust Fund (see METCALF, G. E. (2007): "Federal Tax Policy toward Energy,"
Tax Policy and the Economy, 21, 145-184. for a description of these funds). We also have
precedents for refundable credits for sequestration activities in federal fuels tax credits. In contrast,
we have no administrative structure in place for running a carbon cap-and-trade program. The
Acid Rain Program is a helpful precedent but the value of permits is an order of magnitude smaller
than the potential value of carbon emission permits. It also was highly concentrated among a
small set of electric utilities.
5

Some issues will be different. For example, a cap and trade system will likely need a so-called
safety value or price ceiling as well as a price floor, and there are a number of design issues in
setting the ceiling and flow that are not present in a carbon tax. BURTRAW, D., and K. PALMER
(2006): "Dynamic Adjustment to Incentive Based Policy to Improve Efficiency and Performance,"
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
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where the sources of emissions are likely to be very different (for example,
agriculture and deforestation will play a larger role and energy a smaller role in
developing countries).
Our goal is to consider the design of an ideal tax, a tax that best trades off
the internalization of emissions externalities with administrative and collection
costs. We do not generally consider the political concessions that will be
necessary to enact the tax, leaving that to the give and take of the political
process. Although we understand that a tax as actually enacted will likely be
different than an ideal tax, a model tax is still useful; it can act as a baseline that
the political process can work off of and as a comparison.
Part I provides background on greenhouse gas emissions and the various
regulatory regimes used currently to control them. Part II discusses principles
related to setting the rate, including also the use of the tax revenues and adjusting
for the distributive effects of the tax. Part III considers the tax base. It begins
with a discussion of the theory of setting the optimal base and then turns to the
detail the various production systems and discusses how best to collect a tax on
various types of emissions. Part IV considers sequestration and other carbonreducing activities that should receive tax credits. Part V considers the interaction
of a carbon tax and the trade rules. Part VI considers interactions with other
domestic regulations and taxes that affect carbon emissions. Part VII concludes.
I.

Emissions and current control mechanisms

As background to understanding how best to design a carbon tax regime in
the United States, we begin with a review of greenhouse gas emissions in the
United States. We also briefly review carbon pricing policies in other countries.
A.

Emissions

The U.S. emitted about 7.0 billion metric tons of CO2 equivalents in 2006,
roughly 20 percent of worldwide emissions.6 This amount consists of emissions
of CO2 (80% of the total) and emissions of other gases such as methane and
nitrous oxide that also contribute to the greenhouse effect. It is conventional to
convert the emissions of other gases to CO2 equivalent amounts (CO2e) by
determining how much CO2 would have to be emitted to have the same effect on

6

Net emissions in the United States– gross emissions less carbon sinks – were 6.2 billion metric
tons (U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2008): "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006." Carbon sinks are measured in the EPA report as those arising
from land use, land use changes, and forestry activities.
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the climate. The conversion factors are known as global warming potentials.7
Methane, for example, has a 100 year global warming potential of 21, which
means that a ton of methane has the same climate forcing impact as 21 tons of
CO2. All of the numbers used here are in CO2e units.
About 80 percent of U.S. emissions in 2006 were from the combustion of
fossil fuel.8 Petroleum use makes up about 43 percent of this total, coal makes up
7

Calculation of global warming potentials is not straightforward. The problem is that different
gases have different lifetimes in the atmosphere, so determining the global warming potential
involves aggregating over time. Current inventories of greenhouse gas emissions use the 100
year global warming potentials calculated by the IPCC Second Assessment Report 1996 and are
listed in the most recent IPCC Report, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007):
"Climate Change 2007 -- the Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC," Cambridge University Press. Table TS.2, page 33. To
avoid some of the problems with discounting, the IPCC also reports the global warming potentials
over various time periods. The following is a selection of 100 global warming potentials for
important gases along with their associated U.S. emissions in carbon equivalents in million metric
ton units:
Table X. GWP’s and 2006 Greenhouse Gas Emissions
CO2e (MMT)

GWP

Carbon Dioxide

5,983.1

1

Methane

555.3

21

Nitrous Oxide

367.9

310

HFCs

124.5

140 to 11,700

PFCs

6.0

6,500 to 9,200

Sulfur Hexaflouride

17.3

23,900

Total

7,054.2

Source: EPA (2008), Tables ES-1 and ES-2

8

Parties to the UN Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) must provide
inventories of their carbon emissions. The U.S. inventory is done by the Environmental Protection
Agency following guidelines set by the International Panel on Climate Change pursuant to the
UNFCCC. The most recent data is for 2006. U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
(2008): "Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006.", and our data is
based on this source.
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37 percent, and natural gas makes up the remaining 20 percent. Non-energy uses
of fossil fuel as well as other miscellaneous uses (such as for international
bunkers to supply fuel for shipping) add a modest amount of additional emissions.
Of the three fossil fuels, coal has the highest carbon content per unit of energy
(with the amount varying by type of coal), then petroleum, and then natural gas.
See Figure X.9
Fue l Emission Factors
120

kg CO2/MMBtu

100
80

60
40
20
0
Coal: Electric

EIA (2008)

Natural Gas

Middle Dis tillate
Fuels

Motor Gas oline
and Jet Fuel

Municipal Solid
Was te

The four major end uses of fossil fuels are industrial, transportation,
residential, and commercial. Transportation makes up the largest category of
emissions, making up about 33 percent of fossil fuel emissions (and 26 percent of
all U.S. emissions). Transportation emissions come almost exclusively from
petroleum. Over 60 percent of transportation emissions are from personal vehicle
use with most of the rest from heavy-duty vehicles and jet fuel.
Industrial uses of fossil fuels make up 27 percent of emissions from fossil
fuels (22 percent of the total emissions). About half of these come from direct
combustion of fossil fuels to produce steam or heat for industrial processes and
the other half from electricity use by industry. Residential and commercial enduse make up the rest of emissions from fossil fuel combustion, relying heavily on

9

Data from EIA Voluntary Reporting of Greenhouse Gases website at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/techassist.html and accessed on May 27, 2008.
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electricity, with the remaining amount natural gas or petroleum for heating and
cooking.
Electricity acts as an intermediate source of emissions – emissions result
from the generation of electricity which is then used by consumers in the various
categories listed above (industrial, commercial, residential, and transportation).
Emissions from the generation of electricity were included in the end-use
numbers reported above. Looking at electricity as a separate category, it accounts
for 36 percent of the energy from fossil fuels in the U.S. and 41 percent of CO2
emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The type of fuel used for electricity
generation has a significant effect on emissions. Electricity can be generated
through non-emitting methods such as hydroelectric, nuclear, or geothermal
energy, as well as through combustion of natural gas and coal. Almost all coal
used in the U.S. (93 percent) is used for electricity generation. Conventional use
of coal to generate electricity is by far the highest emitting method of generating
electricity. The following graphic summarizes U.S. fossil fuel emissions, keeping
electricity as a separate category. Environmental Protection Agency (2008) Table
3.1
CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion by Sector and Type
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
‐
Residential

Commercial
Coal

Industrial

Natural Gas

Transportation

Electicity

Petroleum

By comparison to emissions from fossil fuels, emissions from other
sources are small. The table below gives a list of the major sources in the U.S.
Once we move away from fossil fuels, the various sources of emissions quickly
become, as a relative matter, very small. The top non-fossil-fuel-combustion
item, agricultural soils management, produced 265 million metric tons of CO2
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equivalents in 2006 while fossil fuel combustion produced 5,637 million metric
tons, more than 21 times the amount. Cement production caused direct emissions
of 45 million metric tons of CO2 (i.e., emissions associated with the production
process itself, not from the fossil fuel energy used in the process), which is less
than one one-hundredth of fossil fuel emissions. Nevertheless, these sources
together make up about 20 percent of U.S. emissions.
GHG Sources above 20 MMT CO2e in 2006

Rank
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Source
Fossil Fuels
Agricultural Soil Management
Nonenergy Use of Fuels
Landfills
Enteric Fermentation
ODS Substitutes
Natural Gas Systems (methane)
Coal Mining
Iron and Steel Production
Cement Manufacturing
Manure Management
Mobile Combustion
Petroleum Systems
Natural Gas Systems (CO2)
Forest land remaining forest
Municipal Wastewater
Treatment
Solid Waste Combustion

Gas
CO2
N2O
CO2
Methane
Methane
HFC
Methane
Methane
CO2
CO2
Methane
N2O
Methane
CO2
Methane

Methane
CO2
Total
U.S. Total
Source: 2008 EPA Greenhouse Gas Inventory

MMT
CO2e
5,637.0
265.0
138.0
132.0
126.2
110.4
102.4
58.5
49.1
45.7
41.4
33.1
28.4
28.2
24.6

% of
Total
79.9%
3.8%
2.0%
1.9%
1.8%
1.6%
1.5%
0.8%
0.7%
0.6%
0.6%
0.5%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%

Cumulative
%
79.9%
83.7%
85.6%
87.5%
89.3%
90.8%
92.3%
93.1%
93.8%
94.5%
95.1%
95.5%
95.9%
96.3%
96.7%

23.9
20.9
6,864.8
7,054.2

0.3%
0.3%

97.0%
97.3%

While emissions from each of these sources are relatively small, some of
these sources are good candidates for inclusion in the tax base. As we will
discuss below, in determining what should be taxed, we care about marginal
abatement costs – how much emissions can be reduced if an additional dollar
were spent trying to do so – rather than the total size of emissions from a given
source. The reason is that to minimize the total cost of abatement, the tax base
must include low marginal abatement cost items even if their total contribution to
emissions is small. For example, if it is easy to reduce methane emissions from
landfills, it may be important to include them in the tax base notwithstanding the
modest amount of these emissions. Many items with low marginal abatement
costs will be unrelated to fossil fuels. Reilly, J., H. D. Jacoby and R. G. Prinn
(2003)
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Worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases were 42 million metric tons of
CO2 equivalents in 2000. Stern, N. (2007) p 195; World Resources Institute
(2006). Energy use is a relatively smaller component of the worldwide total than
it is for the U.S., comprising just over 60 percent of worldwide emissions
(compared to 80 percent of U.S. emissions). Land use change, particularly
deforestation is a larger contributor worldwide than it is in the U.S., contributing
18.2 percent of emissions worldwide and a negligible amount for the U.S.
Preventing deforestation in Indonesia and Brazil in particular is likely a low-cost
method of abatement and, therefore, important to include in a global climate
policy. Similarly, emissions from agriculture make up about 13.5 percent of
worldwide emissions but only 6.2 percent of U.S. emissions.
B

Existing Carbon Control Regimes

Neither the U.S. nor the rest of the world makes any significant use of
taxes explicitly on carbon. There are currently six taxes explicitly on carbon (five
Scandinavian countries, and the UK). There are, however, a wide variety of taxes
on, and subsidies for, energy (as well as a wide variety of regulatory regimes for
other greenhouse gases). These taxes and subsidies will affect carbon emissions,
although because they are on energy rather than carbon, they will not be designed
to set a uniform price for carbon across different types of energy. Baranzini, A.,
J. Goldemberg and S. Speck (2000) survey energy taxes in 12 countries as of
2000, finding that the vast majority of energy taxes are on gasoline and diesel
fuel, with very few taxes on coal and natural gas.
All of the Scandinavian countries adopted carbon taxes in the 1990s.
These taxes have narrow bases and do not impose a uniform tax on emissions
from the sources that they do cover. Instead, they provide a wide variety of
different rates. Bruvoll, A. and B. M. Larsen (2004) The Norwegian carbon tax
covers about 60 percent of energy-related CO2 emissions and 46 percent of total
emissions. 10 Stern, N. (2007) (Box 15.4, p. 386) and Ekins, P. and T. Barker
(2001) According to Stern, the impact of the tax was weakened because of
numerous exemptions related to competitive concerns. Moreover, the tax did not
accurately reflect emissions from various fuels. Finally, notwithstanding that all
of the Scandinavian countries adopted carbon taxes and that, compared to
differences around the globe, the Scandinavian countries are relatively similar,
they were unable to harmonize their taxes.
10

Norway’s emissions from energy in 2000 were 41.1 million metric tons and total emissions
were 53.8 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents. See BJOTVEIT, I. (2005): "National Inventory
Report 2005 Norway, Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-2003 Reported According to the Unfccc
Guidelines." for the Norwegian greenhouse gas inventory.
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The U.K. imposed a climate tax (known as the climate change levy or
CCL) in 2001. The levy is on industrial and commercial use of energy.
Transportation and domestic use of energy are excluded. The rate is currently
modest. For example, electricity is charged as £4.41 per megawatt hour. Gas is
taxed at £1.54 per megawatt hour. Moreover, taxpayers can enter into agreements
with the government to reduce emissions in exchange for a significantly reduced
rate of tax, effectively converting the climate change levy into a command and
control regulation. Total collections from the levy are around £1 billion annually.
If the United States were to adopt a carbon tax, an important design issue
would be how it interacted with other carbon pricing and energy policies both
domestically and abroad. Internationally, the major program with which a
domestic tax would have to interact is the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS). The ETS is a cap and trade program on EU emissions from the
energy industry plus energy-intensive industries. Phase I of the ETS ran from
2005 through 2007 and was viewed as a trial run to develop the market
mechanisms to support permit trading. Phase II running from 2008 through 2012
is designed to help the EU meet its Kyoto obligation of an eight percent reduction
below the base year levels (generally 1990). The burden sharing allocation within
the EU is complex and Ellerman, A. D., B. Buchner and C. Carraro (2007)
describe it in detail.
We do not discuss the merits of the ETS in this paper but do wish to
comment on two aspects of its design. First, the EU system was implemented at
the electric utility and industry level. This significantly multiplies the number of
covered installations and makes a comprehensive system difficult to implement.
Second, the ETS only covers a relatively small portion of greenhouse gas
emissions in the EU. According to Convery, F. J. and L. Redmond (2007) the
European Commission estimates that less than half of CO2 emissions and less
than one-third of all greenhouse gas emissions will be subject to the ETS caps in
2010. In particular, the transportation sector is excluded. It has been argued that
the transport sector was excluded from the ETS because it was already subject to
high taxes on motor fuels (see Metcalf, G. E. (2008) for a comparison of US and
EU gasoline tax rates). These taxes on motor fuels, however, were presumably
motivated by other externalities associated with driving. Therefore, these taxes
need to be imposed in addition to rather than as a replacement for, a carbon tax.
Moreover, to the extent that an element of these taxes relates to carbon emissions,
nothing precluded the EU from including transport in the ETS and encouraging
member countries to impose motor fuels taxes only to the extent of non-carbon
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externalities from driving.11 To the extent EU motor fuels taxes are to be thought
of as part of their carbon pricing regime, the EU has a hybrid cap and trade, tax
regime rather than a pure cap and trade regime.
None of these carbon pricing regimes services as a good model for the
design of a carbon tax. All have comparatively narrow bases, and are none are
imposed so as to minimize compliance and administrative costs.
II.

Rates
A. Setting the Rates

At the most basic level, the principles for setting the correct tax rate were
established long ago by Pigou: the tax rate should equal the social marginal
damages from an additional unit of emissions. Because marginal damages change
with emissions, the tax rate needs to change as well; the tax rate schedule is
simply the marginal damages curve. Emitters facing this tax schedule would
internalize the cost and set emissions at a level that equalizes the cost to their
marginal benefit from emitting. To impose such a tax, the government would
only need the information required to estimate marginal damages and would not
need information about the costs of abatement.
It is conventional to illustrate this idea using the marginal benefit from
reducing emissions rather than the marginal damages of increasing emissions.
The basic idea is the same and the tax rate schedule under this approach is the
marginal benefit curve. Emitters would set their individual marginal cost of
abatement equal to the marginal tax rate. Graph x below illustrates.

11

One obstacle to this swap is that the permits were given away and so national governments
would lose revenue. But the amounts in question are small. Average gasoline tax rates in OECD
countries other than the United States averaged $2.30 per gallon as of January 2007 according to
the OECD database on environmental taxes at http://www2.oecd.org/ecoinst/queries/ (accessed on
May 8, 2008). At the current price for ETS permits in the neighborhood of €26, this would raise
the price of gasoline by about 35¢ per gallon. A modest amount of auctioning would allow
countries to recoup revenue lost by a gasoline tax offset to transport fuel permit price increases.
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If the tax has to be set at a fixed rate, say, $x per metric ton of CO2, as is
likely in any broad-based tax, the optimal tax would be where the marginal cost of
abatement equals the marginal benefit. (In the chart above, this is labeled t*. The
revenue raised is equal to the shaded rectangle.) To set such a tax, the
government would need to estimate the marginal cost of abatement as well as the
marginal benefit from abatement. This is a more difficult task because the
government needs information about both the marginal damages and marginal
costs of abatement.
There are a wide range of estimates of the optimal tax rate. The
calculation is difficult, perhaps even heroic, because it involves combining
uncertain science, such as the predicting the local effects of climate change, with
predictions of economic and technological developments far in the future, and
discounting those values to the present. The IPCC’s Working Group II surveys
100 different studies of the optimal tax rate and estimates a mean for 2005 of $12
per metric ton of CO2, but notes that estimates range from $3 to $95 per ton.
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), p. 16). The report goes on
to note that these estimates are likely to underestimate the costs of carbon
emissions because of the difficulty in quantifying many impacts. The revenue
raised from such a tax would depend on the coverage and on the elasticity of
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emissions to taxation, but rough and ready figures suggest a modest tax would
likely raise between $75 and $100 billion per year.12
Because of the difficulties in computing the optimal tax rate, an alternative
taken by some analysts is to determine a set of taxes over time that result in
meeting a target for emissions reductions or total carbon concentrations in the
atmosphere. This approach separates the analysis into two components: an
overall social decision about what level of greenhouse gas concentrations we are
willing to tolerate and a technical solution to how best achieve that goal. When
analysts take this approach and use likely targets, the ranges of tax rates they
produce are similar to those from trying to find the social cost of carbon.13
There is a longstanding debate about whether the tax rate should be
adjusted because of interactions with the labor tax. Bovenberg, A. L. and R. A.
de Mooij (1994), Goulder, L. H., I. Parry and D. Burtraw (1997), Fullerton, D.
and G. E. Metcalf (1998). The original view was that environmental taxes create
a “double dividend” because they internalize environmental externalities and
allow the distorting income tax to be reduced by the revenue that they raise. The
most recent view is that the extent to which, and even the direction of an
adjustment to environmental taxes, depends on subtle factors, such as whether
there are pre-existing regulatory regimes and the use of the revenues, rather than a
priori economic reasoning. For example, environmental taxes themselves may
reduce labor supply much the same way as a labor tax and, therefore, substituting
an environmental tax for a labor tax may not reduce such distortions. Regardless
of the details of this debate, given the heroic assumptions needed to compute the
optimal carbon tax rate, the double dividend hypothesis is to a large extent second
order – determining the carbon tax rate at this point involves guessing about
orders of magnitude and not about potentially subtle adjustments.
12

METCALF, G. E., S. PALSTEV, J. REILLY, H. D. JACOBY, and J. HOLAK (2008): "Analysis of U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Tax Proposals," Cambridge: MIT., Table 9, provides revenue estimates for
several carbon tax bills. Their estimates for revenue raised in 2015 from relatively narrow taxes
range from $69 billion to $126 billion. To put this in context, a carbon tax of $25 per metric ton
CO2 would raise the price of gasoline by about 22¢ per gallon and the price of coal fired electricity
by roughly 2.5¢ per kWh. A carbon tax would also increase the price of other commodities that
use energy as an intermediate good. HASSETT, K. A., A. MATHUR, and G. E. METCALF (2009):
"The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis," The Energy Journal,
30, 157-179. estimate that a $25 per ton tax would raise the purchase price of a new automobile by
about 1.5 percent.
13

For a comparison of economic models of climate change using similar emissions scenarios, see
CLARK, L. E., J. A. EDMONDS, H. D. JACOBY, H. M. PITCHER, J. REILLY, and R. G. RICHELS
(2007): "Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Atmopheric Concentrations, Synthesis and
Assessment Product 2.1a."
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B. Revenue and Redistribution
Depending on one's frame of reference, a carbon tax is likely to be modest
to highly regressive. Table X shows the distributional burden of a $15 per ton
carbon tax across households using data from 2003.14
Table X. Carbon Tax Burden Across Income Groups
Income
Decile

Direct

Indirect

Total

Bottom
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Top

2.12
1.74
1.36
1.19
0.97
0.85
0.69
0.61
0.53
0.36

1.60
1.31
0.99
0.88
0.78
0.68
0.61
0.63
0.49
0.45

3.74
3.06
2.36
2.06
1.76
1.53
1.30
1.23
1.01
0.81

Source: Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf (2009). The table reports the within decile average carbon tax
burdens as a percentage of income. Direct burden refers to fuel consumption. Indirect burden refers to
higher prices of goods due to use of energy as an input. The sum of direct and indirect differ from
total due to rounding error.
.

Based on the practice in European VAT systems of zero rating and
exemptions, one might ask whether similar exemptions should be built into the
carbon tax to reduce its regressivity. The answer is no. Instead, the distributive
effects of a carbon tax should be offset through adjustments to the overall tax
system (and in particular, the income tax) rather than through the design of the
carbon tax itself. The reason is that attempts to redistribute through adjustments
to a commodity tax are in general less efficient than adjustments to direct taxes.
Atkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stiglitz (1976), Kaplow, L. (2006) In particular,
adjusting the carbon tax for distributive effects produces the same types of
distortions that adjustments to labor income taxes do. For example, progressive
14

HASSETT, K. A., A. MATHUR, and G. E. METCALF (2009): "The Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax:
A Lifetime and Regional Analysis," The Energy Journal, 30, 157-179. use both annual income
and two measures of lifetime income to distribute the tax across households. Using a lifetime
income measure reduces the regressivity of the tax considerably. METCALF, G. E., S. PALTSEV, J.
M. REILLY, H. D. JACOBY, A. GURGEL, A. SOKOLOV, and J. HOLAK (2008): "Analysis of a Carbon
Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Cambridge, MA: MIT Joint Program on the
Science and Policy of Global Change. show that over time more of the carbon tax is passed back
to resource owners and owners of capital also mitigating the regressivity somewhat.
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taxes reduce work incentives. In addition, adjusting the carbon tax for distributive
effects would reduce the environmental benefits of the tax: carbon emissions
would not be priced equal to their marginal damages. Therefore, the better
approach is to design the carbon tax to best internalize the effects of emissions
and to adjust the income or payroll tax for any distributive effects.
The geographic disparities of a carbon tax could pose an additional
distributive problem. The geographic disparities, however, appear to modest.
Table X from Hassett, K. A., A. Mathur and G. E. Metcalf (2009) gives a recent
estimate of these effects.
Table X. Carbon Tax Burden Across Regions
Region

Direct

Indirect

Total

New England
Mid Atlantic
South Atlantic
East South Central
East North Central
West North Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific

0.73
0.75
0.87
1.19
1.05
0.84
1.08
0.85
0.74

0.76
0.76
0.77
0.75
0.76
0.77
0.78
0.91
0.81

1.47
1.50
1.62
1.92
1.79
1.59
1.84
1.73
1.54

Source: Hassett, Mathur, and Metcalf (2009). The table reports the within region average carbon tax burdens as a
percentage of income. The sum of direct and indirect differs from total due to rounding error.

To a large extent, the design of a carbon tax is separable from the issue of
how to spend the money. Moreover, as noted, the potentially regressive
distributive effects of a carbon tax should be offset through adjustments to the
income tax rather than through adjustments in the design of the carbon tax, so
distributive issues are also separable. Nevertheless, because the revenue and
distributive effects are significant, it is worth a few words on these issues. We
consider two alternatives.
Our first and preferred option is to maintain revenue and distributional
neutrality. The reason would be that whatever the decision is on proper size of
government and proper deficit, the enactment of carbon tax does not change it.
So if the current judgment, right or wrong, is that the federal government should
be 19 percent of the economy, the enactment of a carbon tax should not change
this. Similarly, whatever our decision is on proper degree of progressivity of the
tax system, the enactment of a carbon tax does not change these views. Under
this argument, carbon tax revenues should be used to reduce other taxes in a way

Metcalf/Weisbach

The Design of a Carbon Tax

Page 16

that maintains progressivity. Metcalf, G. E. (2007) provides an example of such a
proposal.
Even if other taxes are adjusted to maintain overall progressivity, a carbon
tax will have a disproportionate impact on certain industries, with the coal
industry being a prime example. Because of its very high carbon content and the
size of emissions from coal combustion, we could not exempt coal from an
effective carbon tax. This suggests the need for transition assistance for coal
industry workers who would be displaced as a result of a carbon policy. Such
assistance need not be that expensive.
The value added by the coal industry (labor compensation, owners’
profits, and indirect business taxes) amounted to $11 billion in 2005. If the share
of labor compensation in coal mining value added is unchanged from 1997 when
labor accounted for one-half the value added in coal mining, the maximum
potential loss to labor is $6.5 billion annually. Demand will fall sharply but not to
zero, so the loss in value added will be less than $11 billion annually. Moreover,
as time goes on, participants in this industry can begin to make adjustments to
move into other sectors. Thus any transitional assistance should be temporary in
nature with particular attention paid to those factors that are least able to transition
to new jobs (e.g., older workers).
A second option is to spend some of the tax revenue to help shift toward a
low-carbon economy. It is certainly the case that an increase in federal research
funding for basic energy-related research and development would be beneficial.
A number of studies suggest that a doubling of such funding over a five to seven
year period could be spent productively (e.g. Furman, J., J. E. Bordoff, M.
Deshpande and P. J. Noel (2007)). This would require funds in the range of $3
billion per year in addition to what is currently spent. This amount could be
funded by removing subsidies to energy production which are either unproductive
or unnecessary in the presence of a carbon tax. By no means would it be sensible
to spend all the carbon tax revenue on basic R&D.
Some funding will also be needed to move to advanced technologies at
scale such as carbon capture and storage. The recent setback in funding for
Future Gen is unfortunate and speaks to the large financial risks facing firms if
they try to undertake such investments on their own. Carbon capture and storage
(CCS) illustrates another set of issues requiring government action. A national
CCS system will require a network of pipelines to move carbon from generators
to storage sites. This may require some funding by the government.15 Similarly,
15

While funding will be required to build this network, as important will be a review and potential
overhaul of state and federal regulatory systems to remove obstacles to the development of this
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low-carbon sources of energy, such as wind, may not be located near population
centers, which means that an enhanced transmission grid may be required. Given
the complex regulatory and land use issues in building such a grid, federal
involvement and funding may be necessary.
In addition, enhanced support for energy efficiency investments
contributes to a reduction in energy consumption and carbon emissions.
Increasing energy prices through a carbon tax will contribute to increased
efficiency investments to be sure but two factors suggest benefits from more
generous tax credits for efficiency investments: First, certain sectors of the
economy may not respond to energy price increases arising from a carbon policy.
Commercial real estate and rental housing are sectors where the economic agent
who makes efficiency investments (developer or homeowner) is not the person
who benefits from the energy savings (tenant). Second, the hidden nature of many
efficiency improvements makes it difficult to recapture the energy savings
through their capitalization into building prices or rents. In addition, empirical
work suggests that efficiency investment tax credits have a substantial impact on
efficiency investments (see Hassett, K. and G. E. Metcalf (1995)).
In summary, we believe that in large measure funds from a carbon tax
should be used as part of a carbon tax swap that is revenue and distributionally
neutral. A small portion of the funds might be directed to transition relief for
displaced workers, basic energy R&D, to providing support to solve vexing issues
associated with bringing CCS to scale, to help construct any necessary
transmission lines, and perhaps to encourage conservation activities that market
imperfections might otherwise block. But we reiterate that the decision on how to
spend carbon tax revenues is separate from the decision to enact a carbon tax.
C. Initial enactment and grandfathering
There are a number of choices regarding how to impose a carbon tax in its
initial period, the most important being a slow ramp-up of the tax, grandfathering
existing emissions, or a cold-turkey introduction. A slow ramp up would
gradually introduce the tax over time, perhaps by starting with low initial rates or
a narrow initial base and then increasing the rates or base at a preannounced
schedule to reach the desired system. Grandfathering would exempt from
taxation a baseline level of emissions, such as an amount equal to emissions in a

network. Important questions include at what level in our federal system will regulatory oversight
of this network take place? What is the right balance between national interests in a CCS system
and local property rights? Who will bear the liability if stored carbon leaks in the near or long
term? What insurance mechanisms will be necessary to cover that liability?
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reference year. Cold turkey would simply introduce the tax without any special
provision for transition.
While cold turkey is likely the least politically feasible approach, it is our
preferred approach. There are two reasons. First, cold-turkey introduction
maximizes what we might call the “anticipation effect.” If businesses understand
today that the eventual carbon tax will be imposed without special relief for
existing investments, they will start adjusting their behavior now, anticipating the
future effects of the tax. For example, a utility constructing a power plant now is
more likely to use gas instead of coal if it will be subject to a future tax on carbon
emissions (gas being much less carbon intensive than coal). We can, in effect,
think of this as pushing some of the effects of the policy earlier in time, which in
this case is a good thing. Kaplow, L. (1986), Shaviro, D. (2000).
The usual argument against this sort of anticipation effect is that
individuals act or should be allowed to act without trying to guess future
government policy – they should be allowed to rely on current law. The
government by passing current law has, in effect, told people what their
compliance obligations are, and it is unfair to change that midstream. This
argument, however, is circular. Individuals or industries only know they can rely
on unchanging rules (or grandfathering if the rules do change) if there is some
external reason why that should be the case. For example, the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution allows property owners to rely on their rights to prevent
government takings. Taxes, however, change all the time and there is no fairness
reason why people should be able to rely on them not changing. This is
particularly true with respect to a carbon tax as carbon pricing policies have been
widely discussed for a long time.
Second, the revenues raised by a carbon tax are likely to be significant –
in the range of $100 billion per year – and those revenues can likely be spent in
better ways than grandfathering carbon emissions. For example, the taxes could
be used to reduce the income or payroll taxes. Alternatively, shifting to a low
carbon economy may take significant changes in infrastructure and some of the
tax revenues could be used to pay for those changes. As implied in our discussion
of the use of revenues, it is hard to imagine that there are not better ways to spend
the money than giving it to industries that currently emit carbon. Metcalf, G. E.
(2007) shows that grandfathering the energy sector also has perverse
distributional consequences. The value of grandfathered permits accrues to
owners of capital thereby exacerbating the undesirable distributional
consequences of carbon pricing.
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A slow ramp up can be seen simply as an intermediate solution between
grandfathering and cold turkey. It is like grandfathering that is phased out over
time. Therefore, the same arguments apply to the extent the phase in is like
grandfathering.
Note that the possibility of grandfathering a carbon tax based on business
as usual emissions allows a carbon tax to have the same effect as a cap and trade
system with free allocation of permits, if such a system were to be desired. In
particular, one claim that a cap and trade system is more efficient than a tax is if
blocking industries must be bought off to allow legislation to pass, a cap and trade
system can do so relatively efficiently through the free allocation of allowances.
This is relatively efficient because the blocking industry would still face the right
price at the margin – it would benefit from any increase or decrease in emissions
by an amount equal to the price of the permits. A tax, it is claimed, must exempt
the industry to buy it off, which is less efficient. This, however, is not true. An
identical economic outcome can be obtained in a carbon tax by taxing emissions
above some floor. This preserves the impact at the margin while exempting initial
emissions in a lump sum fashion.16
D. Anticipated Rate Schedule
The optimal schedule of tax rates will depend on how the target is being
set. In a welfare maximizing framework where the benefits and costs of carbon
abatement are both taken into account the tax rate should match social marginal
damages across time.17 Where the goal is to cap emissions at some fixed amount
over a set time period, the tax rate should grow at the rate of return on capital.18
Metcalf, G. E., S. Palstev, J. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby and J. Holak (2008) develop the
argument as follows. They start by imagining that we issued permits instead of
taxes, issuing today the set of permits that can be used over time. The permits
would be an asset. Holders would save that asset for later use if its value went up
faster than the rate of return on other assets and use it sooner if its value when up
slower. In equilibrium, therefore permits will increase at the same rate as the
return on other forms of capital. Taxes and permits, however, are merely
substitute methods of imposing the Pigouvian price on emissions in the absence of

16

An interesting issue we have yet fully resolved is why the EU Emissions Trading System
required participating countries to freely allocate permits instead of giving each local country the
choice. This is particularly puzzling in light of the inefficiency of free allocation.

17

This abstracts from the second-best considerations discussed above.

18

This abstracts away from risk or multiple forms of capital with different return characteristics.
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uncertainty. Therefore, if permits optimally have this price pattern, taxes must as
well.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2008) undertakes an explicit welfare-maximizing
analysis and finds that tax rates grow over time at a pattern that is similar to but
not exactly exponential. His model includes population growth, technology
changes, and non-constant discount rates. If there are technological surprises, the
optimal tax rate will also adjust to take these into account. In general, in broadbased general equilibrium models we would expect the optimal tax rate to grow at
an underlying exponential growth rate that is modified by other forces at work in
the model.
The real world is significantly more complicated than even the most
complex computable general equilibrium model. Multiple forms of capital exist
with different rates of return based on their risk characteristics. What is the right
capital return to benchmark the growth of the carbon tax rate? The logic of
Metcalf et al. suggests that the appropriate capital return to use is that with similar
risk characteristics to the hypothetical permit program that is equivalent to the
carbon tax. But immediately the logic breaks down since taxes and permit
systems are no longer equivalent in a world with uncertainty.
In practice the best we may be able to do is set out a given real growth rate
for the tax rate (say, 4 or 5 percent real) in carbon tax legislation and anticipate
the need to adjust the rate as more information becomes available. We turn next
to this issue.
E. Rate changes
Tax rates must be adjusted to reflect new information about the marginal
cost and marginal benefit of abatement. We are likely to get new information
about these all the time as the science of climate change progresses and as
abatement technologies are discovered and developed. The question is how often
to change the tax rate.
Many commentators have expressed concerns over the price volatility
associated with cap and trade systems because of worries that price volatility will
reduce or delay long-term investment. It is not clear, however, why carbon prices
are different than any other sort of price. The price of a barrel of oil changes all
the time, and yet markets function and investment takes place. Those who need
price stability use futures markets or other hedging techniques. On the other
hand, there is a belief in the value of stability in law, expressed in the judicial
doctrine of stare decisis. We do not know in general how important stability in
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the law is. The costs and benefits of rapid changes to carbon prices, therefore,
remain unknown.
We need not resolve the issue of the optimal pace of change for laws –
there is surprisingly little literature addressing this point – because most
significant abatement opportunities involve long-term investments, such as the
structure of the power industry. This means that there will be little benefit from
adjusting rates in the short run. Thus, if a utility is considering the design of a
power plant that has a 50 year life, it probably would matter little whether the
carbon tax were to adjust every year or every five years. If there is any cost to
frequent changes, therefore, less frequent changes would be preferred.
The question for the design of a carbon tax is whether there is some
mechanism for causing intelligent rate changes to happen at regular intervals.
One possibility is to delegate the responsibility to set the rate to an expert agency.
An agency would have the advantage of being able to revisit the rate at regular
intervals and the advantage of experts who are able to distill the complex
information needed to determine the correct rate. Agencies commonly set prices
for significant items when they set electricity, airfares, and railroad rates.
Agencies have also been used to set tariffs. Although many of these pricing
decisions are now made in the private market, the government must set the tax
rate and these examples illustrate the feasibility of delegation of similar
decisions.19
If Congress is unwilling to delegate tax rate decisions of this scope to an
agency – the revenue numbers are large and many important industries or regions
can be hurt – intermediate solutions are available in which an agency recommends
a rate and then various procedural rules force consideration of the
recommendation by Congress or even perhaps even give procedural protection to
the recommendation. The military base closing commission might serve as an
example. An even more mild form of delegation is to require a commission to
meet on a regular basis to recommend rates. Although most commissions have
little effect, there have been some that have worked, notably the Greenspan social
security commission.
If an intermediate delegation system of this sort is not feasible, Congress
might consider a system that forces reconsideration of the rate at regular intervals.
19

Various ways of framing the tax may change perceptions of whether delegation is appropriate.
For example, if the tax is seen as a user fee, delegation may seem more appropriate. Similarly, if
carbon tax revenues are dedicated to a particular source, the entire system looks more like
traditional agency action as compared to the setting of a tax rate that raises general revenues.
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Two obvious possibilities are a pre-scheduled rate that either goes up quickly,
forcing Congress to act to reduce it as necessary, or a rate that goes down quickly
(i.e., the tax expires), forcing Congress to increase it.
III.

The Tax Base

We begin the discussion of the carbon tax base with a review of the theory
of how to set the base when there are measurement and collection costs. We then
turn to a discussion of particular sources of emissions, focusing first on fossil
fuels and then on other sources of emissions.
A. Theory
Absent administrative, enforcement, and political costs, an ideal tax
system would include all activities that produce climate externalities. This
includes emissions of all greenhouse gases from any activity, including not only
energy usage but also agriculture, forestry, and industrial emissions. Moreover,
absent administrative costs, the tax would include not only emissions of gases but
any climate forcing including, for example, changes to albedo caused by forestry
activities. (Trees at certain latitudes absorb sunlight, reducing albedo and causing
warming.)
There are, however, hundreds of sources of greenhouse gases in the U.S.
and other countries, most very small contributors. Moreover many sources of
emissions may be hard to measure and tax. To determine the optimal tax base, we
must compare the administrative savings of a narrow base with the efficiency
benefits of a broad base. In particular, the tax base should be set so that the
benefit of a small expansion in the base is equal to the increase in administrative
or compliance costs.
We can think of broadening the tax base as rotating the marginal
abatement cost curve downward – a broader base will include more sources of
abatement and therefore, reduce the cost for any given amount of abatement. In
figure X below, the steeper marginal abatement cost curve reflects a narrow tax
base. Broadening the base rotates the curve to the right and optimal abatement
increases from AN to AB given the marginal benefit of abatement curve MB. The
marginal benefit from broadening the tax base is equal to triangle abc in the
diagram.20

20

This abstracts from interactions with other tax distortions. In a second-best world with preexisting distortions, lowering the environmental tax rate will have first-order efficiency gains not
reflected in the diagram.
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To determine whether it is desirable to add any particular item to the tax
base, we have to determine the size of the relevant triangle and the administrative
cost of taxing the item. To determine this, we need to know the marginal
abatement cost curves for various types of emissions and the costs of
administering a tax on those items. In our discussion below, we use the estimates
of the marginal abatement costs produced by the EPA in 2006. (EPA 2006). We
do not have data on the administrative costs of including various items in the tax
base; we make judgments based on information about the relevant activity, but
better data might lead to a revision of these judgments. In general, items, with
large opportunities for low-cost abatement and that are easy to monitor are
candidates for inclusion in the tax base.
We also note that there is also a set of complicated political
considerations. Adding items to the tax base increases the number of special
interests that will oppose the tax. At the same time broadening the base allows
the tax rate to be lower overall, thereby possibly reducing opposition from those
already in the base.
A final tax base issue is whether to tax greenhouse gases on the basis of
where the products giving rise to emissions are produced (an origin basis) or
where the products are consumed (a destination basis). This distinction matters
where trade is involved. We defer discussion of this point until section __ below
but note here that we propose a modified origin basis. We would levy a tax at the
border on fossil fuel imports from countries that do not have a substantive carbon
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pricing system in place. Fossil fuel imports from countries that do have a carbon
pricing system in place would not be subject to a border tax. This principle would
extend to a number of carbon-intensive products as discussed below. In neither
case would the U.S. carbon tax be rebated on exports.21
B. Fossil Fuels
Fossil fuels made up approximately 80 percent of U.S. emissions in 2006.
Energy Information Administration (2007) Most developed countries have a
similar profile. Developing countries will tend to have higher emissions from
agricultural and deforestation, so considerations of how to include those activities
in the tax base will be more important for developing countries.
There are two principles, one physical and one economic, which allow us
to substantially reduce the collection and enforcement costs for a tax on emissions
from fossil fuels. The first is that a unit of fossil fuel will emit the same amount
of carbon regardless of when or where it is burned. For carbon emissions from
fossil fuel combustion, there is a perfect correspondence between input and
output. Therefore, we can tax the input – the fossil fuel – rather than the output –
the emission. (The exception to this rule is for fossil fuel permanently
sequestered, such as fuel used for tar or carbon that is captured and stored. This
issue is discussed in section _ below.)
The second principle is that the incidence of a tax (and its efficiency
effects) is unrelated to the statutory obligation to remit the tax. This means that
we can impose the tax (choose the remitting entity) to minimize collection and
monitoring costs and to ensure maximum coverage. In general, imposing the tax
upstream (i.e., at the earliest point in the production process) will achieve these
goals as there are (1) far fewer upstream producers than there are downstream
consumers and (2) because of economies of scale in tax administration, the cost
will be lower per unit of tax.
To illustrate, there are approximately 149 petroleum refineries in the U.S.
but there are 247 million drivers as well as millions of users of other petroleum
distillates. Imposing the tax at the refinery level on petroleum products will be far
less expensive than, say, trying to monitor emissions at the tailpipe. Similar
principles apply to other fossil fuels. The key is to find a place between
extraction and consumption where it is simple to tax all or almost all of a fuel.

21

Maintaining the origin basis principle, it is presumed that countries with carbon pricing systems
in place would not tax imports from the US that already have a carbon tax embedded in their price.
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Arguments for downstream imposition of the tax tend to be based on a
claim that a downstream tax is more visible and, therefore will have a greater
effect. The claim would be that consumers’ response depends on visibility.22 It is
doubtful that this effect could be very large in the case of a carbon tax for two
reasons. First, firms are likely to advertise the embedded tax in, say, gasoline, so
that drivers would be aware that part of the cost of the gasoline is the tax.
Second, key energy consumers – electric utilities and industrial energy users – are
unlikely to be affected by this behavioral phenomenon.23
1. Natural Gas
Natural gas was responsible for 1,163 million metric tons of CO2
emissions in the U.S. in 2006. Energy Information Administration (2007) (p. 11,
Table 4) (This is burned natural gas that produces CO2 as opposed to release of
natural gas or methane into the atmosphere.) It is used largely for heating in the
industrial and residential sectors and to produce electric power. Energy
Information Administration (2006) It is a very efficient fuel in the sense that it
produces a large amount of energy for a given emission of CO2.
Natural gas is produced in a variety of circumstances. Most natural gas
comes from stand alone gas wells but some is associated with oil production.24
An additional source (about 9 percent of the U.S. total) comes from coal beds.
There were almost 450,000 natural gas wells in the U.S. in 2006, and we would
need to tax about 100,000 of them to get 90 percent coverage of U.S. production.

22

CHETTY, R., A. LOONEY, and K. KROFT (2007): "Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence,"
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. and FINKELSTEIN, A. (2007): "E-Ztax:
Tax Salience and Tax Rates," Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. present
evidence that the saliency of a tax increases the elasticity of demand among consumers (Chetty et
al) and among commuters on a toll road (Finkelstein).

23

None of the existing carbon pricing schemes are imposed upstream. Instead, they tend to be
imposed midstream, on large industrial point sources of emissions, such as power plants and
industrial users of fuel. For example, the EU emissions trading regime is imposed midstream. The
reason appears to be that countries in the EU wanted to exclude transportation from their system.
An upstream tax would have a harder time excluding transportation, so the compromise was a
more expensive downstream tax. A related issue is the allocation of free permits. If there are
short-term price rigidities (such as through electricity price regulation, for example), it may matter
which entities receive the free allocation. Midstream allocation of the permits may allow
politicians to buy off potentially blocking interests.

24

For a summary of natural gas production data, see
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_NUS_a.htm

Metcalf/Weisbach

The Design of a Carbon Tax

Page 26

Most natural gas, when extracted is “wet” and must be converted to “dry”
gas before it is put into the pipeline system. There are 530 large natural gas
processors in the lower 48 states and these process a substantial majority of the
natural gas used.25 Energy Information Administration (2006). Some natural gas,
however, is processed close to the point of extraction in smaller “skid” processors
and some natural gas, mostly coal bed methane and some wells that produce dry
gas, enters the pipeline system without substantial processing.
Once processed, natural gas enters into the pipeline system and is
delivered to the local distribution companies. Virtually all gas goes through the
pipeline system. Not all gas goes to a local distribution company, however, as
some large volume consumers buy directly from the transmission pipelines.
We would propose that all sources of natural gas entering the pipeline
network be made subject to the tax. This would include all processors, the 55
import points and the few producers that do not need to process gas before
entering the pipeline. This would include coal bed methane. Most natural gas is
processed and there are a relatively small number of processors, thereby ensuring
substantial coverage at a minimal cost. In addition, by taxing at the processor, we
avoid the problem of different wells producing natural gas of differing carbon
content (i.e., differing amounts of containments). An alternative would be to tax
the transmission pipelines but we would need to determine a method of avoiding
duplication of the tax if natural gas is transmitted through more than one pipeline.
Most natural gas used in the U.S. is produced here, but some is imported
through pipelines from Canada and through liquefied natural gas facilities from
other places. There are right now only 55 locations where natural gas (or
liquefied natural gas) can be imported or exported, consisting of five liquefied
natural gas facilities and 50 pipelines. Energy Information Administration (2007)
These are all regulated by the FERC. All of these facilities would need to be
added to the tax base, bringing the total up to 585 taxpayers to cover virtually 100
percent of natural gas emissions.
2. Coal
Coal can be taxed at the production level (mine and import) or at the
consumption level (electric utiltiies and industry). We recommend the former.
There were 1,438 operating mines in the U.S. in 2006. Energy Information
25

A modest amount of natural gas enters the pipeline network without processing.
ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (2006): "Natural Gas Processing: The Crucial Link between
Natural Gas Production and Its Transportation to Market." p. 3.
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Administration (2007) Almost all coal used in the U.S. is produced here and there
are very few exports. Taxing at the mine would capture virtually 100 percent of
U.S. coal production. Moreover, as noted, coal mines are potential sources of
methane, either captured and put into the pipeline system or released into the air.
If it is captured, this source of methane may not need to be processed Therefore,
having mines as taxpayers may create synergy – they can pay the tax on this
source of natural gas or methane as well. If it is not captured, coal mines should
pay a tax on any release. Coal-bed methane emissions were around 58.5 million
metric tons of CO2 equivalents, so imposing this tax will be important.
An alternative is to tax coal downstream. Almost 93 percent of coal is
used in electricity generation and nearly all the rest is used by industry. There are
1,493 coal generated power plants in the U.S., so taxing the power plants would
not be more difficult than taxing at the mine and would have only a slightly
smaller base. Taxing at the utility, however, would mean losing the synergy
created by taxing at the mine discussed above.26 As there does not appear to be
any advantage to taxing at the utility and some disadvantage, taxing at the mine
seems to be preferable.27
In the U.S., coal is sorted into four types: anthracite, bituminous,
subbituminous, and lignite. Each of these grades has a different carbon content
and, therefore, would need to face a different tax rate.28 If the carbon content is
within any one of the U.S. grades is relatively uniform, there would be little
reason to consider a more fine-grained approach. If, however, there is significant
variation within a grade, finer gradations may be worth considering. Existing cap
and trade bills in Congress generally delegate this decision so the relevant agency,
and a similar delegation would probably be sensible for a carbon tax.
26

It also increases the administrative burden for power plants that are dual-fired (burning coal and
natural gas). Plants burning coal would be required to file taxes while plants burning only gas
would not.

27

If a large percentage of utilities are in eventually the tax system because of credits for carbon
capture and storage activities, there may be little difference in the number of taxpayers. Mines
will be taxpayers because of coal-bed methane and coal-burning utilities will be taxpayers because
of CCS. Moreover, unless CCS credits were refundable or tradable, having utilities being
taxpayers may reduce problems with unusable credits. On the other hand, CCS does not right now
exist in the U.S. and it is not clear how long it will be before it is in widespread use. Taxing
utilities may also be more complex because some plants can use more than one type of fuel, so the
tax would have to vary depending on the fuel being used. In addition, taxing utilities would
require industrial users of coal to be subject to tax separately, a step that is not necessary if the
mines are taxed.

28

Germany apparently uses eight grades, with the carbon content varying by grade.
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3. Petroleum
The two potential places to tax petroleum products are at the well (or at
import) or at the refinery. Taxing petroleum downstream is impractical – there
are over two hundred million drivers plus many users of distillates other than
gasoline. There were only 149 operating refineries in the US in 2007, making the
refineries a logical place to impose the tax. Refineries could pay a separate tax on
each distillate depending on the carbon content. Distillates, such as tar, that will
not be burned would not be subject to tax. Imports of crude from countries with
no carbon pricing system would be subject to the tax at the refinery without any
special provision. Imports of refined products (about 3.5 million barrels/day),
however, would need to be taxed.29
Refineries often engage in inventory exchanges with other refineries.
Although normally, the sale of inventory would be the event that triggers the
carbon tax, inventory exchanges should not be taxed because doing so would
cascade the tax: the inventory would be taxed when refinery 1 exchanges it with
refinery 2 and once again when refinery 2 sells it into the market.
4. Other issues with the taxation of fossil fuels
We approached carbon emissions from fossil fuels by looking at each fuel.
It is worth pausing to look at whether the structure of particular industries will
affect how the tax works. We examine here permanently sequestered carbon,
regulated power, and transportation (road, air, and sea).
The most important issue with respect to the regulated power industry is to
ensure that the tax is part of the rate base so that it is passed on to customers. If it
is not, users will not see the appropriate price, defeating part of the reason for the
tax. (Investors would see the effect, potentially leading to beneficial diversion of
investment into low carbon technology.) This should not be an issue with a tax on
the fuel purchased by the utility: if the tax is imposed upstream, it would simply
be embedded in the price and naturally flow into the rate base. This presumes that
state regulators allow utilities to flow through fuel cost increases into higher
prices. It is not obvious that this will always occur. Regulatory reluctance to
flow permit costs through to higher prices will likely be higher for a cap and trade
29

An advantage of taxing at the refinery is that we would be setting rates for refined products that
could then be used for taxing imports of refined products.
Note that we need to ensure that any fuel used by refineries would be taxed under this system.
That is, we have to ensure the tax on refined products is not only on the sale of refined products
but also in the refinery’s own use of any petroleum.
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system where permits are given away; there is an opportunity cost to using a
permit, even if received for free but it is very unlikely that the opportunity cost
would be in the rate base.30 Similar issues may arise with respect to tax credits
intended to act similarly to freely allocated permits.
The major issue with respect to road transportation is the interaction with
existing tax and regulatory regimes. There are gas taxes under current law as well
as regulatory regimes, such as CAFE, designed to alter gasoline usage. The
question is whether the carbon tax goes on top of these regimes or replaces some
or all of them.
There are numerous externalities from driving, including (noncarbon)
pollution, accidents, and congestion. Parry, I. and K. A. Small (2005) find that
the optimal gas tax is roughly twice as high as the current U.S. tax. The major
component of the tax is congestion externalities, and carbon emissions are a
relatively small element. Therefore, the imposition of a tax on petroleum and
hence gasoline to internalize externalities from carbon emissions should not result
in a reduction in the existing gasoline tax.
The appropriate treatment of aviation and other bunker fuels is part of the
larger issue of carbon leakage and optimal border tax treatment. We discuss this
in greater detail below. But we make some preliminary comments here. Taxing
emissions from aviation on purely domestic flights would be straightforward – jet
fuel would be taxed at the refinery. There are, however, two problems with
taxing emissions from international aviation. The first is that there is an existing
treaty under the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) that prohibits
imposing taxes on fuel carried on international services. Second, because of the
possibility of fueling or refueling in countries without a tax, leakage could be a
significant problem. Moreover, if we cannot know when fuel is taxed at the
refinery whether it will be used for international or domestic flights, taxing fuel at
the refinery may not be feasible.
There are several options. First, we could impose a tax on international
aviation by making several adjustments. The ICAO treaty could be renegotiated
(or we could simply breach it). In addition, to prevent leakage, we could impose a
surcharge for any fuel taken on in a non-taxing country for flights whose
30

MATHUR, A., K. A. HASSETT, and G. E. METCALF (2008): "The Consumer Burden of a Cap-andTrade System with Freely Allocated Permits." discuss the distributional implications of different
regulatory treatment of freely allocated versus auctioned permits.
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destination is within the United States. The second alternative is to forgo taxing
fuel used in international aviation. Airlines would get a credit for fuel used in
international flights much like the crediting system for CCS. The problem with
this alternative is that it would leave out a significant source of emissions –
globally international aviation emissions are about twice as great as domestic
aviation emissions. Stern, N. (2007) p. 549.
The economic issues are similar for bunker fuels in shipping. While there
is no treaty preventing the taxation of bunker fuels, the problem of leakage is
serious – ships would have incentives to refuel in locations where there is no tax.
Moreover, it might be more difficult to track fuel use on ships that on aircraft,
making it more difficult to impose a surcharge for such refueling.
C. Other sources of emissions
In addition to fossil fuel combustion, greenhouse gas emissions arise from
1) non-combustion CO2 emissions; 2) non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions,
including agriculture; and 3) forestry and land use activities. We discuss below
the extent to which these sources should be included in the tax base. The EPA
data on marginal abatement costs allows us to estimate the benefits of including
various sources in the tax base, but there is no data on the administrative costs of
doing so. Therefore, the judgments below are necessarily preliminary and greater
study of most of these sources of emissions is warranted.
1.

Non-Combustion CO2 emissions

Non-combustion carbon dioxide emissions account for less than 4 percent
of CO2 emissions in 2006. Cement manufacturing and steel and iron production
account for nearly half the emissions in this category. It may be reasonable to
include their emissions (as well as emissions from a few other industries in this
category) in the tax base.
Cement manufacturing produces about 46 million metric tons of CO2 per
year separate from the energy used during production. The emissions stem from
the production of clinker, an intermediate product, which is a combination of lime
and silica-containing materials. According to the U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency (2008), the quantity of CO2 emitted during production is directly
proportional to the lime content of the clinker (p. 4-5). The tax would be imposed
at the source of clinker production. There are 118 cement plants in the United
States owned by 39 companies. These are large, stationary sources of emissions
and, therefore, should be relatively easy to tax.
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Steel and iron production produced 49.1 MMT of CO2 in 2006 and 0.9
MMT of CO2e of methane. The emissions, separate from emissions associated
with the energy used to produce iron and steel, come from the production of
metallurgical coke, pig iron, and steel itself. The emissions can be measured
indirectly by the amount of coke, pig iron, and steel production. The tax can be
applied at the point of production. There are only 23 steel mills in the U.S.
Therefore, like cement manufacturing, steel and iron production should be
relatively easy to include in the tax base.
2.

Other Greenhouse Gas Emissions

In addition to carbon dioxide, a number of other gases contribute to global
warming. Gases other than carbon dioxide account for 15 percent of total U.S.
emissions with methane being the most important., followed by nitrous oxide.
Fluorinated gases and sulfur hexafluoride are modest contributors but have very
high global warming potential. Sulfur hexaflouride, for example, has a 100 year
global warming potential of 23,900. Using this conversion, a $25 per ton CO2e
carbon tax would be equal to $597,500 per ton SF6. Therefore, even a modest
carbon tax may have a large effect on the use of these chemicals. While non-CO2
emissions are not a large share of total emissions, studies suggest that they will
provide a relatively low-cost source of emission reductions under a carbon tax or
other form of carbon pricing. Paltsev, S., J. M. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby, A. C.
Gurgel, G. E. Metcalf, A. P. Sokolov and J. F. Holak (forthcoming), for example,
estimate that nearly half the initial emission reductions from carbon pricing would
come from reductions in non-CO2 emissions.
Two-thirds of all methane emissions come from three sources: enteric
fermentation (126.2 million metric tons of CO2e), landfills (125.7) and natural gas
systems (102.4). Coal mining and manure management add about another 100
million metric tons.
Enteric fermentation comes primarily from the digestive process in
ruminants, in the U.S., largely cattle, which produces methane. The feed quality
and feed intake affect emissions. The U.S. inventory system measures emissions
from enteric fermentation through detailed calculations that separate cattle by
region, age, sub-type (dairy cows, beef cows, dairy replacements, beef
replacements, steer stockers, heifer stockers, steer feedlot animals, and heifer
feedlot animals), and production (e.g., pregnant, lactating). They use estimates of
the digestible energy from various diets to determine emissions from the various
categories.
The EPA estimates the marginal abatement costs for methane from enteric
fermentation. For the United States, it estimates that emissions in 2010 could be
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reduced by 6.4% at zero cost and 21.4% at $45/ton. (EPA 2006 V-49, Table 118) These are reasonably large reductions for the cost. As a result, we might
consider levying a head tax on cattle based on average emissions for a small
number of cattle types. Since modifications to diet can reduce emissions, tax
payers should be allowed a reduced rate when proof is provided of the use of
approved diets that reduce emissions.
According to the EPA Inventory, roughly 1,800 operating landfills exist in
the United States. Municipal landfills account for nearly 90 percent of methane
landfill emissions with industrial landfills making up the rest. Methane recovery
has grown over time since 1990 federal regulations required large landfills to
capture and combust landfill methane (thereby converting it to less potent CO2).
Whereas only 20 percent of landfill methane was burned for gas, flared, or
oxidized in 1990, over half of the methane emissions were in 2006 (Table 8-3).
The EPA estimates that with a $45/ton tax, more than 80% of U.S. landfill
emissions could be eliminated. (EPA 2006, III-10, Table 1-6) Requiring
monitoring of all landfills and including their emissions in the tax base should be
relatively straightforward.
Methane emissions from natural gas systems arise in field production
(27%), processing (12%), transmission and storage (37%) and distribution
(24%).31 So-called “directed inspection and maintenance” can significantly
reduce these emissions. (EPA 3006, II-16). Implementing the carbon tax on
processers will ensure that nearly three-quarters of these emissions are brought
into the carbon tax base and thereby provide the appropriate incentives to
producers to implement improvements to reduce accidental releases. Scope
appears available for improvement.
Despite the growth in natural gas
consumption between 1990 and 2006, emissions in the processing, transmission
and storage, and distribution stages fell by nearly twenty percent.
Bringing emissions in the field into the tax system is probably not
realistic. Instead, mandates for certain processes or technologies may be useful
here. The rising price of natural gas over time will also provide an incentive to
reduce emissions (as they reflect natural gas that cannot be sold).
Methane emissions from other sources can be considered for inclusion in
the tax base on a case-by-case basis. Emissions from coal mines, are easily
monitored and collected in some but not all cases. Nearly two-thirds of these
emissions come from underground mines (Table 3-26, EPA (2008)) where
31

Shares of emissions from U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2008): "Inventory of
U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006."
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methane is removed through ventilation systems for safety reasons and so can be
collected, measured, and made subject to the tax.32 Emissions from surface
mines, on the other hand, are more difficult to capture as they are released as the
overburden is removed. These emissions are much lower in amount, however.
(EPA 2006, II-2-3). The EPA estimates that almost 86% of methane emissions
from coal mining can be eliminated at $15/ton, making coal-bed methane a good
target for inclusion in the tax base. (EPA 2006 II-10, Table 1-8)
Nitrous oxide has a high global warming potential. Nearly three-quarters
of the 368 million metric tons CO2e of emissions come from agricultural
management activities. These emissions are a prime example of a case where
there are large emissions (almost 4% of the US total) but where it will be difficult
to include them in the tax base. The reason is that the emissions stem from a wide
variety of hard to observe sources. The particular extent of emissions depends on
the precise nature and location of the activity, making it difficult to set tax rates.
A full exploration of emissions from agricultural soil management would need a
separate study. We make only a few initial observations here.
Nitrous oxide is produced naturally in soils through nitrification and
denitrification.
Various agricultural activities increase mineral nitrogen
availability in soils, increasing the amount of nitrous oxide emitted. These
include application of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, organic amendments to soil
(such as manure, compost, and sludge), urine and dung from grazing animals, and
crop residues.33 Various soil management activities, such as irrigation, drainage,
tillage, and fallowing of land influences nitrogen mineralization. See U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency (2008).
The precise emissions from any given activity depend on many factors.
For example, the granularity of the soil affects the process of denitrification.
Environmental Protection Agency (2007) p 6-16. This means that the tax rate can
only be correct on average. Actual emissions from any particular activity cannot
be measured. Instead a tax will have to rely on rough proxies, such as the total
amount of fertilizer applied, or the total number of livestock grazing during the
32

Prior to 2002, coalbed methane was eligible for the section 29 non-conventional fuels tax credit
of $3 per barrel of oil equivalent (see CARLSON, C., and G. E. METCALF (2008): "Energy Tax
Incentives and the Alternative Minimum Tax," National Tax Journal, 61, 477-491.). The credit
could be reinstated or methane flaring could be allowed as an offset activity to provide a financial
incentive to capture these emissions.
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Figure 6-2 in U. S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (2008): "Inventory of U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2006." provides a picture of agricultural sources of
nitrogen that result in N2O emissions.
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year. It is worth noting, however that EPA (2008) estimates that roughly twenty
percent of N2O emissions arise from the use of artificial fertilizers. A fertilizer
tax would likely lead to less fertilizer use but could lead to other practices that in
turn release nitrogen. For example, if fertilizer is taxed but manure is not, there
would be incentives to substitute toward manure (thereby making livestock
relatively less expensive as an output would become more valuable and, therefore,
possibly increasing emissions from livestock).
The second largest source of nitrous oxide is mobile combustion emissions
(33.1 million metric tons). Mandating annual vehicle emissions tests would
provide a way to include these in the tax base.34 The remaining nitrous oxide
emissions can be added to the tax base on a case by case basis.
There are a large number of manmade gases (generically, fluorinated
gases) used throughout the economy with high global warming potentials.35
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and related chemicals were in wide use prior to the
Montreal Protocol but were banned because of their effect on ozone.
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) were developed as alternatives to these ozonedepleting substances for industrial, commercial, and consumer products. The
global warming potentials of these gases range from around 140 (HFC-152a) to
11,700 (HFC-23).36 They have varying atmospheric lives, with some very short
and some ranging up to tens of thousands of years. If treated as a single category,
they make up about 123 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions in the US each year. This would make them one of the top five sources
of emissions.
Because they have a very high global warming potential, the tax on these
chemicals will be many times the market price. The price signal from taxation,
therefore, may be very important for these chemicals. Nevertheless, they may not
34

Annual emissions are the product of emissions per gallon gasoline, miles per gallon, and miles
driven. The first and third components of this can be measured at the inspection (assuming
mileage records are kept as part of the inspection). Assumptions about fuel efficiency can be built
into the tax based on year and model of the vehicle.
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Information for this section of the paper comes from INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (2005): "Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate System: Issues Related
to Hydrofluorocarbons and Perfluorocarbons," Cambridge University Press..
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The global warming potential of these gases is very sensitive to the period of measurement as
they have a wide range of atmospheric lifetimes. See table TS.2, p. 33-34 in — (2007): "Climate
Change 2007 -- the Physical Science Basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth
Assessment Report of the IPCC," Cambridge University Press. for a completely list of these
chemicals and their global warming potentials over various periods.
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be easy to tax through a direct mechanism. The reason is that emissions from
fluorinated gases are largely fugitive emissions, gases that inadvertently escape
through leakage or inappropriate disposal. For example, a significant source of
HFC’s is leakage from air conditioning for cars and trucks. Similarly, certain
types of foam contain significant HFC’s and improper disposal can lead to the
eventual release of the gases. This means that there is no observable transaction
on which to base the tax.
A promising method of taxing emissions of these gases is a deposit-refund
system. In a deposit refund system, an initial presumptive tax on the manufacture
or purchase of an item is levied and a refund provided upon proof of proper
disposal. To illustrate, consider an automobile with an air conditioner that uses
HFCs. Imagine that it uses an amount that if emitted to the atmosphere would
trigger a tax of $1,000. Any HFCs that have not leaked out of the car can be
recovered upon scrapping of the car and reused thereby avoiding any release to
the atmosphere. Rather than try to tax the leakage, we can impose a tax of $1,000
per unit when purchased and a refund of the tax for all HFCs that are recycled
upon retirement of the automobile. Even though disposition of the automobile
may not be easily monitored, an incentive exists to capture and recycle the HFCs.
The tax is then paid only on the HFCs that have leaked out of the car over its
lifetime.37
A deposit refund system potentially works in the fluorinated gas context
because there are a relatively few manufacturers, making collection of the upfront
tax easy. For example, there are only five producers of HFC’s in the U.S. right
now. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2005) In addition, in many
places, there are well-developed recycling, reuse, or disposal requirements for
these chemicals, which means that tracking disposal would not be expensive. In
addition, given the refund upon proper disposal, there would be an incentive to
reveal information about disposal to be eligible for refunds. For example, HFC’s
are currently used in vehicle air conditioning systems. When a vehicle is junked,
there would be an incentive to remove the system with the HFC’s intact to obtain
the refund.
A deposit refund system faces many of the same design issues as does a
tax. For example imports would have to be carefully monitored and taxed. If the
gases can be imported without tax, businesses could earn profits by manufacturing
37

Deposit-refund systems are discussed extensively FULLERTON, D., and A. WOLVERTON (2005):
"The Two-Part Instrument in a Second-Best World," Journal of Public Economics, 89, 19611975.. It might be necessary to create tightness quality standards for automobile air conditioners
since it is difficult for the consumer to monitor the quality of the air conditioner.
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the chemicals abroad for the sole reason of obtaining the refund in the U.S. Since
most of the HFCs are used in refrigeration and air conditioners, it is likely that
imposing a tax on import should not be overly difficult.
In a related vein, some of these gases are used in the production of other
goods, such as the use of perfluorocarbons in semiconductor manufacturing.
Unless imports of goods manufactured with these chemicals are subject to tax,
taxing domestic production would create an incentive to shift production abroad,
particularly because the tax would be many times the cost of the chemical (due to
the high global warming potential). Moreover, an accurate tax on imports might
be difficult to assess because the tax should be on the emission of these gases and
emissions from manufacturing abroad would not be observable. Therefore,
depending on how easy it is to shift manufacturing using these gases abroad, a
lower tax rate may be appropriate. This is simply another example of the border
tax problem that we discuss below.
A major source of emissions of fluorinated gases comes from existing
banks of these gases rather than new production. According to the IPCC, there
are almost 21 million metric tons of CO2 equivalents in banked fluorinated gases.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2005) For example, because of the
Montreal Protocol, production of CFC’s has ceased in the developed world.
Nevertheless, emissions from CFC’s continue because they remaining in existing
refrigeration and other systems. Banked gases will not have been subject to the
tax on production, so the question is whether they should be subject to the refund
on proper disposal. Our view is that they should: the refund on proper disposal
creates an incentive not to emit these gases. Given the size of existing banks,
proper disposal is important. This is analogous to an offset provision for
greenhouse gas emissions that are not included in the tax base.
Finally sulfur hexaflouride is a potent greenhouse gas. It is used on
electrical transmission and distribution equipment with most emissions arising
from leakage. Emissions of SF6 fell by fifty percent between 1990 and 2006
(EPA (2008)) reflecting the higher price of the product. A deposit-refund
mechanism here would be a relatively simple way to bring this gas into the carbon
tax base.
3.

Forestry and Land Use Activities

Forestry and land use serves as a net sink, removing some 900 million
metric tons of CO2e in 2006 from the atmosphere. Changes in land and forest use
can add or remove carbon on balance. Adding these activities to the tax base
would require establishing a base line. To see the complexity of this, consider a
forest that currently sequesters 100 tons of carbon dioxide per year. Should an
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owner of that property receive a tax credit for the 100 tons of sequestered CO2?
Or perhaps the owner should be subjected to a tax on 50 tons of CO2 because an
"undisturbed" forest would sequester 150 tons of CO2. One way to proceed
would be to set as a baseline emissions/sequestration as of the first year of the
carbon tax. If the tax is anticipated, this creates an incentive to cut down the
forest prior to the first year of the tax so as to obtain large amounts of credits in
early years (young forests absorb more carbon than do mature forests).
Once a baseline is set, a forestry carbon assessment could be undertaken
periodically (say every ten years) and the tax applied retrospectively. Continuing
with the example above, assume the forest in question is an immature forest and
over a ten year period sequestration falls to 80. With 100 established as the
baseline, the annual emissions would be estimated to rise from zero to 20 by year
ten. The retrospective tax would be equal to 2 tons in year 1 times the tax rate in
that year plus 4 tons in year 2 times the tax rate in that year and so on to year 10
when the tax rate is 20 times the tax rate in that year. Landowners could be
required to make estimated payments over the decade in anticipation of the
retrospective liability. See Reilly, J. M. and M. O. Asadoorian (2007) and
Metcalf, G. E. and J. M. Reilly (2008) for further discussion of this point.
One can imagine any number of complications with such a system. It may
be preferable to leave forestry and land use out of the tax system but provide the
opportunity for them to opt in through offsets. This might be limited to major
land owners to limit administrative costs. Considering forest ownership, we
might limit offsets to the major paper and forest product companies and require
that they consider offsets on their entire stock of land rather than individual
parcels. This reduces problems of non-additional projects (projects that lead to
local reductions in greenhouse gas emissions but not to global reductions).
4.

Summary

We offered a brief survey of non-fossil fuel combustion emissions.
Determining the full extent of the tax base for these emissions would require a
more detailed examination of each item. Based on the analysis above, however, it
seems likely that we could include somewhere around half of the emissions from
sources other than fossil fuel combustion at a reasonable cost.
IV.

Carbon Sequestration Credits

We have noted above in several places the need to provide credits for
activities that permanently sequester carbon. Carbon capture and storage, for
example, is a much discussed technology to capture CO2 emissions from coal
combustion in electricity generators. The CO2 is compressed, liquefied, and
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transported to a geologically desirable location where it is permanently stored
underground. The technology for CCS is well understood and CO2 is injected
underground now as part of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) methods. StatoilHydro
has a CCS program in place at its Sleipner natural gas field. It captures one
million metric tons of CO2 annually and stores it 800 meters below the seabed.
Gas from the Snovhit field is converted to liquefied natural gas and the CO2
frozen and removed. The CO2 is transported back to the field and stored in a
porous sandstone structure below the gas field. A third CCS project in the Saleh
gas field in Algeria currently captures and reinjects roughly 700,000 metric tons
of CO2 into the gas field.38 The Weyburn-Midale fields in Saskatchewan, Canada
are oil fields where CO2 is used for EOR on a large-scale. The CO2 is purchased
from the Dakota Gasification Company synfuels plant in North Dakota and
shipped by pipeline to the Canadian fields. It currently sequesters nearly 9000
metric tons of CO2 per day in the field making it the largest sequestration project
in operation today.39
While it is clear that CCS works in single applications, little is known
about the potential to scale this up to levels that will be required given our current
or projected coal consumption. It is noteworthy that none of the existing projects
are associated with coal production. Deutch, J. and E. Moniz (2007) address the
obstacles that the United States faces in developing a major CCS program for
coal. They estimate that a price in the neighborhood of $30 per ton CO2 begins to
make CCS economically viable. This assumes the various technical, regulatory,
and political obstacles can be overcome.
Regardless of the feasibility of CCS, the carbon tax will only provide an
incentive for sequestration if the tax base excludes fossil fuel use for which
emissions are captured and stored. This can be done either by explicitly
excluding such fuels (and other gases for which sequestration occurs) from the tax
base or by levying the tax and providing a credit for approved sequestration
activities. We advocate the latter as being easier to administer. Credits could be
applied against carbon tax liability. Because firms engaging in CCS and other
approved sequestration activities may not be the same firms that pay the carbon
tax, we recommend that the credits be made tradable as is effectively done with
other tax credits such as the low income housing tax credit. Making the credits
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Information about these projects comes from StatoilHydro's website at
http://www.statoilhydro.com/en/EnvironmentSociety/Sustainability/2007/Environment/Climate/C
arbonCapture/Pages/CarbonCaptureAndStorage.aspx, accessed on May 31, 2008.
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Information taken from http://www.ptrc.ca/weyburn_overview.php accessed on May 31, 2008.
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tradable ensures that their full value is realized by firms engaging in sequestration
activities.40
Tax credits are also an issue for fossil fuels that are used as feedstocks,
asphalt, lubricants, waxes, and other uses. Table X breaks down emissions for
these uses as well as carbon storage.
2006 Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Storage from Non-Energy Fuel Use
Source

Emissions

Stored

Feedstocks
Asphalt
Lubricants
Waxes
Other
Total

83.0
0.0
19.1
0.8
35.2
138.0

132.4
92.8
1.8
1.1
11.4
239.4

Percentage
Stored
62%
100%
9%
58%
24%
63%

Source: Tables 3-14 and 3-15 in U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (2008).

Emissions from non-energy use accounted for 2 percent of total emissions
in 2006. Feedstocks are the main source of these emissions. An upstream carbon
tax will incorporate these emission sources in the tax base. The more salient issue
for non-energy fuel use is to ensure that we only tax emissions and not the carbon
that is captured and permanently sequestered. As Table X above indicates, the
percentage of carbon stored ranges from very little (lubricants) to all (asphalt). A
simple tax credit works well where 100 percent of carbon is captured (as is the
case with carbon capture and storage or the use of fuels in asphalt). For
intermediate fuels used as feedstocks, the 2008 EPA greenhouse gas report
assumes that 62 percent of all carbon is stored regardless of the feedstock source.
Thus one approach would allow a credit for fuels sold as feedstocks to receive a
partial credit (62 percent of a CO22e ton per credit) with periodic updating of the
storage factor as needed. For the other category in Table X above, storage factors
range from 10 percent for industrial coking coal to 50 percent for petroleum coke
and distillate fuel oil. It may be that providing a credit for asphalt and feedstock
use is sufficient given the small amounts of stored carbon in the other categories.
Credits can be combined with offsets for non-covered activities. As noted
above, we see a role for qualified offsets that pass the additionality test (they are
40

The final incidence of the credits will depend on the relative supply and demand elasticities for
these credits. We anticipate that the demand elasticity would be significantly greater than the
supply elasticity so that most of the value of credits will go to firms engaging in approved
sequestration activities.
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activities that lead to a net reduction in emissions and would not have taken place
in the absence of the offset funds). The difficulty of course is in assessing
additionality. Offsets would be provided to entities that demonstrate to the
government's satisfaction that their non-tax base activities are reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. The offsets could be traded like the tax credits and
used to reduce the carbon tax liability. An open question is whether offsets
should be limited to activities within the United States or available for activities
undertaken elsewhere. For example, offsets might be allowed for projects that
satisfy CDM criteria.41 The experience with CDMs is instructive here. Progress
has been very slow in certifying and accepting CDM projects. This occurs on a
case-by-case basis. Some have argued for sector-based CDM eligibility. All the
issues that arise with assessing CDM projects would also arise with domestic
offset programs.
V.

Trade

Because carbon emissions are a global externality – emissions anywhere
affect everyone – and because of the large volume of trade in fossil fuels and in
goods produced with fossil fuels, carbon taxes must always be designed with
international considerations in mind. In an ideal, and imaginary, world, all
countries would impose a harmonized carbon tax so that emissions anywhere in
the world faced the same price. Realistically, some major emitting countries
either will refuse to impose any price on carbon at all or do so in a narrow or
perfunctory way. Even countries that impose carbon pricing regimes may not
harmonize their regimes creating problems when goods subject to different tax
rates are traded.
There are good arguments that a border tax is not inconsistent with, and in
fact is required by, the principles of free trade. Free trade relies on the principle
of comparative advantage. In a free market, everyone is better off if those who
can produce a good at lowest cost do so. A country without a carbon price does
not have a true comparative advantage in producing carbon-intensive goods
compared to a country with a carbon price; it produces at what looks like a lower
cost only because the nominal price of the good does not include the full costs of
production.
The key problem with border tax adjustments for carbon is determining
the carbon content of goods that are exported or imported. Unlike border tax

41

Of course, projects that are used as offsets under a U.S. carbon tax should not be allowed as
offsets under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
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adjustments under a VAT, which are based on the price of the good, the carbon
content of a good is not readily observable.
So long as the two trading countries both have a carbon price, however,
border tax adjustments are not necessary. If both trading partners have carbon
prices, neither would gain an advantage in trade with the other. Therefore, we can
substantially reduce administrative costs by using an origin basis system (i.e., no
border tax adjustments) for trade between countries with an adequate carbon
price. Imports from countries without an adequate carbon price would, however,
most likely need to be subject to a tax at the border as a substitute for their lack of
a carbon price, and below we discuss ways to administer such a system. Exports
to these countries could either be allowed a rebate for carbon taxes here or not;
there may be modest efficiency advantages to allowing a rebate but the
administrative costs might be substantial.
Although a complete discussion of the issues applicable to border tax
adjustments for carbon taxes requires a separate paper, we provide a short
discussion of the issues here.
A. Trade in Carbon-Intensive Goods
Before discussing the economic and legal issues related to border tax
adjustments, it is worth having a sense of the extent of trade in carbon-intensive
goods and the sources of imports. To start, the six most energy-intensive U.S.
manufacturing industries are petroleum refining, paper, mineral products (such as
lime and cement), chemicals, ferrous metals (iron and steel), and nonferrous
metals (largely aluminum). Energy Information Administration (2002). Border
tax adjustments for imports of crude oil for petroleum refining should be
relatively uncontroversial, so the major issues relate to the remaining five
industries.42
These products vary in their exposure to trade. We import more than 40
percent of our aluminum and copper, but only 13-15 percent of our paper.
Surprisingly, the United States imports 25 percent of the cement it consumes
notwithstanding its weight. Houser, T., R. Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and
R. Heilmayr (2008). The most energy-intensive goods tend to be less exposed to
trade than non-energy intensive goods. To illustrate this relationship, we
reproduce below a table from Houser, T., R. Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and
R. Heilmayr (2008) that charts energy intensiveness relative to share of imports.
42

We focus here on energy intensive goods. Note, however, that there may be goods that have
high associated emissions because they are produced using high global warming potential gases.
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The size of the bubbles represents emissions (which can vary with energy
intensity based on the source of energy):

Although trade discussions often explicitly or implicitly focus on China
because of its increasing share of imports into the United States, China is a
relatively small exporter of carbon-intensive goods. Canada is instead the
dominant exporter of such goods to the U.S. Below we reproduce data from
Houser, T., R. Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and R. Heilmayr (2008) on
imports by origin for steel, aluminum, chemicals, paper, and cement. As can be
seen, China is significant only with respect to cement and Canada dominates all
categories except for chemical imports, where it is second.
U.S. Imports by Origin, 2005

1
2
3
4
5

Steel
Source
%
Canada 18.6
EU
17.3
Mexico 13.1
Brazil
8.2
China
7.1

Aluminum
Source
%
Canada 51.0
Russia
17.1
EU
6.2
OPEC
5.1
Brazil
3.8

Chemicals
Source
%
Trinidad 41.6
Canada
19.3
Ukraine 7.3
OPEC
6.6
EU
4.5

Paper
Source
%
Canada
66.9
EU
16.8
China
3.5
S. Korea 2.2
Mexico
2.2

Cement
Source
%
Canada
16.1
China
14.0
EU
13.9
OPEC
10.0
Thailand 8.6

Source: Houser et al. (2008)

It is worth making several comments on this table. First, it does not
include finished products such as automobiles. These products may be very
carbon intensive and their sources may be different than the sources listed above.

Metcalf/Weisbach

The Design of a Carbon Tax

Page 43

Second, the manufacture of many of these items has been shifting toward
developing nations, so the 2005 data presented by not reflect long term trends.
Finally, as discussed below, even a large majority of our imports of carbon
intensive goods comes from developed countries that are likely to enact or have
already enacted carbon pricing regimes, border tax adjustments can still be
important because they will have net revenue effects (unlike in the typical case of
border tax adjustments under a VAT). We discuss this latter point below.
B. The Effect of Border Tax Adjustments
1. The effect of border tax adjustments for a specific excise tax.
Border tax adjustments provide a rebate for any taxes paid when a good is
exported and impose a tax when a good is imported. They are standard in VAT’s
around the world. VAT’s with border tax adjustments are known as destinationbasis VAT’s. A VAT without border tax adjustments is known as an origin-basis
VAT. Virtually all VATs are destination basis.
As is well-known, border tax adjustments under a broad-based VAT have
no net present value effect. The reason is that the present value of exports has to
be equal to the present value of imports. Therefore, the present value of the
rebate on exports has to equal the present value of the tax on imports.43 There are
timing differences in the flow of revenues to the government – imports and
exports with the same present value can happen at different times – but the longterm effect has a net present value of zero.
Because origin and destination-based systems have the same net effect, it
does not matter which system is used, apart from tax administrative cost and
compliance issues. Moreover, it does not matter whether countries imposing a
VAT harmonize with one another with respect to border tax adjustments (again,
apart from administrative or compliance issues).
These results do not hold for a specific excise tax like a carbon tax. We
consider four effects. First, border tax adjustments will have present value
revenue effects. The reason is that the present value of imports and exports of
embedded carbon may not be the same. Carbon intensive products can be
imported in exchange, say, for services or exported for non-carbon intensive
goods. The taxes or rebates on carbon products will not be offset by the taxes or
rebate on the services or non-carbon intensive goods. For trade between two
countries with harmonized carbon taxes, the main effect of border tax adjustments
43

The key assumption is that the VAT covers all exports and imports.

Metcalf/Weisbach

The Design of a Carbon Tax

Page 44

is the revenue: a destination-basis system (one with border taxes) gives the
revenue to the country where consumption takes place while an origin basis
system (one without border taxes) gives the revenue to the country where
production takes place.
Second, border tax adjustments and the location of tax remittance interact.
Once we are in a world with cross-border trade in taxed products, it is no longer
true that the location of tax remittance matters only with respect to administrative
and compliance costs. Instead, countries that import carbon-intensive goods
benefit with a destination-based system while countries that export carbonintensive goods benefit with an origin-based system.
To illustrate, suppose that a carbon-intensive good, say petroleum, is
produced in three stages: extraction, refining, and consumption. Suppose also, as
is often the case, that extraction takes place in a different country than refining
and consumption. In particular, suppose that C1 extracts oil and sells it to C2 in
exchange for untaxed items. C2 then refines and consumes the oil.
If C1 collects the tax at the wellhead and there are no border adjustments,
C1 keeps the revenue and, depending on the incidence of the tax, some
combination of individuals in C1 and C2 bear the tax. If there are border tax
adjustments in both countries, C1 would rebate the taxes when the oil is exported
and C2 would impose a tax when the oil is imported. In effect, the border tax
adjustment acts as an indirect transfer of the tax revenues from the extracting
country to the consuming country. If, on the other hand, the tax is collected at the
refinery or on consumption, border tax adjustments have no effect because the tax
is imposed in the same country as the consumption. There is no occasion for
border tax adjustments to operate.
In general, if the good is produced in one country and consumed in
another, it matters if the tax is remitted by the producer or the consumer of the
good and whether there are border tax adjustments. To foreshadow the discussion
below, if we conclude that border tax adjustments for a carbon tax imposed
upstream are illegal under current trade law but a carbon tax imposed directly on
consumers would not be illegal (because there would be no border tax
adjustments), we are effectively saying that the legal rules care about the technical
issue of which entity is responsible for tax remittance rather than the economic
effects of border tax adjustments. This seems inappropriate.
Third, when there is trade between two countries with carbon taxes, the
system of border tax adjustments has to be harmonized. Either both countries
need to impose border tax adjustments or neither. The reason is that without
harmonization, products can either be subject to double taxation or no taxation,
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depending on the direction of trade. To illustrate, suppose that both C1 and C2
have carbon taxes, and that C1 has no border tax adjustments and C2 has them. If
a product is produced in C1 and is subject to a carbon tax in C1 and then is
exported to C2, there will be no rebate by C1 as there are no border tax
adjustments. C2, however will impose a tax at the border, resulting in a double
tax on the product. If a product is produced in C2 and exported to C1, however,
there would be no tax because C1 would rebate the tax at the border and C2 would
not impose a border tax adjustment. Thus, harmonization is needed.
Note that the same effect can occur in a world entirely without border tax
adjustments but where countries do not harmonize on the location of tax
collection. For example, if C1 imposes a tax upstream on producers and C2
imposes a tax downstream on consumers, we get exactly the same result, two
taxes on the same emission, even if neither C1 nor C2 has border tax adjustments.
Border tax adjustments eliminate this problem because they ensure that the
consuming country ends up with the tax. In this sense, we can view border tax
adjustments as simply a mechanism for allowing the location of tax remittance to
be determined on purely administrative cost grounds. (As we will see, however,
there is a trade-off because border tax adjustments themselves are complex.)
Finally, and most centrally, border tax adjustments ensure that the terms of
trade are consistent with the principle of comparative advantage where one
trading partner has a carbon price and the other does not. As noted above, if two
countries produce a good at the same cost but one imposes a carbon tax on
production and the other does not, it is not correct to say that the country without
the tax has a comparative advantage and, therefore, is the efficient producer of the
good. The sole advantage of the non-taxing country is simply its willingness to
impose an externality on the rest of the world. This is not an advantage that the
free trade laws should protect.
Another way to say this is that the logic behind free trade relies on wellfunctioning markets to allocate production of goods. When there is a massive
externality such as the emission of carbon, a Pigouvian tax on the externality is
entirely consistent with free trade as the tax ensures that prices are correct.
Border tax adjustments are necessary to impose a Pigouvian tax where there is an
export from a non-taxing country.
One of the arguments made against border tax adjustments for carbon
taxes is a slippery slope argument: if border tax adjustments are allowed in this
case, they would be allowed for a wide variety of measures with protectionist
intent or effect. Any “trade plus” problem (trade plus labor, trade plus
environment, etc.) can be recast as an externality. For example, low-wage or
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child labor in a trading partner can be thought of as creating externalities in the
form of empathy for the workers. A border tax would be necessary to internalize
this harm. Because almost anything can be cast as an externality, there appears
to be no limits to this logic.
Slippery slope arguments rely on an institutional inability to distinguish
cases. The argument is that if we take action x, we inevitably will take action y,
and action y is undesirable. This logic seems spurious in the context of climate
change. Legal and tax systems around the world regularly must decide which
types of harms to recognize. For example, tort systems must decide when an
action by one party creates a compensable obligation. Harms such as that
expected from climate change – measurable and large harms – are easily
distinguished from other types of harm.
2. Border tax adjustments and renegade countries
Carbon tax design and implementation will likely take place in a world
where at least some major producing countries do not agree to impose a tax (or
other carbon pricing regime) or do so only at minimal levels. Thus, China or the
United States, or some other major producing country, may not find it in its
interest to impose a carbon pricing regime when other major countries do. Border
tax adjustments can play a central role in such a world. There are two effects:
preventing “leakage” and encouraging renegade countries to put a price on
carbon.
Leakage in the carbon pricing context refers to the shifting of production
to countries that do not impose a price or otherwise regulate carbon. A producer
in a country with a carbon tax might move the location of production to a country
without the tax and thereby avoid the tax.44

44

A second reason why carbon leakage will occur in these circumstances is that if the demand for
energy goes down in the taxing countries because of the carbon tax, it will be cheaper for
production in non-taxing countries to use energy intensive production processes. If the U.S.
reduces its demand for oil, China may simply increase its demand, offsetting the conservation
efforts made in the U.S.

The extent of carbon leakage is uncertain and is the subject of a number of studies. Modeling the
problem is complex because it requires modeling production location decisions. Technological
change also plays a role. Thus, BABIKER, M. (2005): "Climate Change Policy, Market Structure,
and Carbon Leakage," Journal of International Economics, 65, 421-445. argues that carbon
leakage from the Kyoto Protocol may actually be substantially more than 100 percent – Kyoto
would actually increase total carbon emissions. DI MARIA, C., and E. VAN DER WEFT (2008):
"Carbon Leakage Revisited: Unilateral Climate Policy with Directed Technical Change,"
Environmental and Resource Economics, 39., however, argue that induced technological change
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With a border tax adjustment, the tax cannot be avoided by altering the
location of production. Suppose that production was originally taking place in C1
and some consumption was taking place in each of C1 and C2. If C1 imposes a
carbon tax without border adjustments and C2 does not impose a carbon tax,
shifting production to C2 avoids the tax entirely. If C1 imposes border tax
adjustments, there is no advantage to shifting the location of production.
Consumption in C1 will be taxed and consumption in C2 will not be taxed
regardless of where production takes place. Thus, border tax adjustments reduce
this form of leakage.
The second, closely related, reason for having border tax adjustments is to
reduce the incentive for countries to be renegades. The focus in this second
argument is on the incentives on countries themselves as opposed to the
incentives on industries. Border tax adjustments reduce the benefit to renegade
countries of remaining renegades because they would no longer be able to attract
production through their lack of a carbon tax.45
A mixed regime of border tax adjustments for renegades and no
adjustments (an origin-based system) for countries with harmonized taxes could
be used to actually create an incentive for renegades to price carbon. In
particular, suppose that border tax adjustments were only applied to imports and
exports from countries without a carbon pricing mechanism. Goods from a
country without carbon pricing exporting to a country with a carbon tax would
face a border tax adjustment and the revenues would go to the consuming country.
There would be no tax revenues and no advantage for the non-pricing country. If
the country prices carbon, however, it would get to keep the revenues – there
would be no border adjustment – but not face any additional disadvantage with
respect to trade. (Its own citizens, of course, would now be subject to a tax on
carbon consumption, but the tax could be made revenue neutral through
reductions in other taxes.)

may counterbalance the effect of carbon prices on the terms of trade. The idea is that high carbon
prices in countries that impose a tax or quota change the relative profitability of investing in clean
technology. There are numerous other studies of the issue. Regardless of the extent of leakage,
however, it is clear that any leakage is inefficient and that border tax adjustments prevent leakage
through the location of production decisions.
45

This border tax adjustment is slightly different than that discussed in VAT systems as we would
not rebate the tax on exports to renegade countries.
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C. Legal Issues with Border Tax Adjustments
The legal status of border tax adjustments under a carbon tax is uncertain.
The problem with their legality relates to the detailed rules under the GATT and
WTO governing border tax adjustments in general and the scope of the so-called
environmental exception. A detailed discussion of the legal issues related to
border tax adjustments for carbon taxes is well beyond the scope of this paper.46
Briefly, a tax on import can only be imposed if there is an equivalent tax on like
products in the home country. There are two key phrases: “likeness” and “on the
product.”
“Likeness” does not include how a product is produced. Thus, a widget
produced using coal as the source of energy and an identical widget produced
using hydroelectric power are considered like products if the widgets themselves
are alike. If a product is produced in a foreign country using a different method
than that used in the importing country, the importing country may not be able to
impose a border tax based on the emissions created by the production of the good.
Conceivably, the likeness restriction would not be fatal as we could
impose a tax on imports equal to the tax imposed on domestic production of the
good. This would be imperfect – foreign producers with high emissions would
face too low a tax and foreign products with low emissions too high a tax.
Nevertheless, if the variance in emissions from production of the good is not too
great, it may be a reasonable approach.
The second phrase in the rule, however, may make this approach illegal.
We cannot impose a border tax adjustment equivalent to the domestic tax unless
the domestic tax is “on the product,” and it is unclear whether a carbon tax is a tax
“on the product.” A tax on profits from production of the product is not a tax on
the product – it is a tax on profits. Because the same product can face different
taxes based on the production mechanism (and under the reasoning behind the
“likeness” rule, production methods are not part of the product), the tax is
arguably not on the product at all. Therefore, even a tax on imports based on
domestic emissions when the product is produced may not be legal.

46

For a discussion, see Goh, G. (2004). "The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax
Adjustment at the Border." Journal of World Trade 38(3): 395-423, de Cendra, J. (2006). "Can
Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-a-vis
WTO Law." Reciel 15(2): 131-145, Ismer, R. and K. Neuhoff (2007). "Border tax adjustment: a
feasible way to support stringent emission trading." European Journal of Law and Economics 24:
137-164.
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Tax rebates on exports are covered under a different set of provisions
governing illegal export subsidies. Rebates are allowed for “prior stage
cumulative taxes” borne by a like product when destined for local consumption.
The definition of this phrase, prior stage cumulative taxes, is obscure but under
existing interpretations, there are serious concerns that a carbon tax would not fit
the definition.
Finally, mixing origin and destination-based systems to create an incentive
for renegade countries to impose a pricing regime would arguably fail the most
favored nations rule, which is a fundamental tenet of trade law. In particular,
renegade nations subject to a border tax would argue that they are treated worse
than other nations, contrary to the most favored nations clause principles.
An entirely separate and possibly more promising legal approach is to
claim that border tax adjustments are allowed under the so-called environmental
exception to the normal GATT rules. Under these rules, trade restrictions are
allowed if needed to protect “human, animal, or plant life or health” or if they
relate “to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” and “such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.” Any such trade restriction under these rules must not be applied
“in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade.”
Interpretation of these various conditions has been controversial. There
have been many attempts to prevent trading partners from engaging in various
practices viewed by the importing nation as inappropriate. Thus, the U.S.
attempted to impose rules to protect dolphins when tuna are harvested or and rules
to product turtles were affected by shrimp farming. Most of these restrictions
have been struck down, although the U.S. turtle/shrimp rules were allowed. The
reasoning behind these cases is obscure – it is difficult to differentiate dolphinsafe tuna and turtle-safe shrimp.
It is difficult to see why the legal rules should be interpreted to prevent
border tax adjustments. As noted above, direct taxation of the consumer would
have the same effect as taxation of production plus border tax adjustment, and
there is no argument that direct taxation of consumers would be an illegal trade
barrier. Border tax adjustments are also consistent with, indeed mandated by, the
principles behind free trade. On the other hand, GATT rules are often formalistic,
drawing distinctions that do not seem to make sense. Border tax adjustments are
allowed for indirect taxes like the VAT but not for economic equivalents, like
wage taxes.
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As noted above, a concern with border tax adjustments for carbon is the
problem of slippery slopes. Although carbon emissions are a very serious
international problem, allowing taxes on imports under an environmental or
human health argument would allow all kinds of less justified border taxes.
Without a clear set of principles delineated when border taxes for externalities
will be allowed, trade courts might be reluctant to allow any. We do not think
that this concern should prevent necessary border tax adjustments for a problem
as serious as climate change.
D. The Problem of Determining Carbon Content
Beyond legal issues, a central problem with border tax adjustments is that
it will be difficult to determine the carbon content of a good when it is imported.
This problem is especially salient for so-called non-Annex I countries under the
UNFCCC. These countries do not submit regular, detailed carbon inventories,
making it difficult to determine the carbon content of their exports. Moreover,
these countries may not agree to impose a price on carbon.47
One suggestion that has been made is that the border tax be imposed based
on the carbon that that would have been emitted had the product been produced in
the U.S.48 This proposal gets around the “likeness” problem with a tax on imports
(although there remains the problem of whether a carbon tax is a tax on the
product). It also reduces the information problem both by using domestic
information and by limiting the class of goods it applies to.
The major problem with this tax is that it will often be very inaccurate
because foreign production of a good often results in very different emissions that
U.S. production. To illustrate, we reproduce below a table from Houser, T., R.
Bradley, B. Childs, J. Werksman and R. Heilmayr (2008) that estimates the
carbon intensity of steel production in major producing countries. As can be seen,

47

For example, a number of studies have measured the carbon content of U.S. produced goods
relying on input-output accounts. HASSETT, K. A., A. MATHUR, and G. E. METCALF (2009): "The
Incidence of a U.S. Carbon Tax: A Lifetime and Regional Analysis," The Energy Journal, 30,
157-179. Comparable quality data that covers multiple years in an up to date fashion simply do
not exist, for example, for China and other major exporting developing countries.
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For example, this proposal has been suggested jointly by American Electric Power and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (see description and discussion in COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE (2008): "Climate Change Legislation Design White Paper:
Competitiveness Concerns/Engaging Developing Countries," Washington, DC: U.S. House
Committee on Energy and Commerce.)
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there are dramatic differences. The U.S. tax on steel would be significantly too
low for imports of steel from Russia, for example.

Similarly, U.S. carbon intensity for chemicals is different from the intensity in
other countries and, in this case, often higher, producing too high a border tax.
On a related matter, a tax based on U.S. emissions would not create any
incentive for foreign producers to substitute toward low-emission production
techniques. The tax would remain the same, so if a low emission production
technique is otherwise less desirable, the tax will not induce the needed
switching.49
An alternative system would be to base border tax adjustments on
estimates of average emissions in the exporting nation from production of a given
good. This would require information about production techniques and energy
49

An additional problem might arise if emissions from production of a good vary widely in the
U.S. It would then be difficult to determine which production system to base the border tax on.
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systems abroad at the national level but not the firm level. While possibly more
information intensive than basing the tax on the importing country’s emissions, it
is potentially more accurate. Thus, the border taxes for steel would reflect the
national differences illustrated in the table above. The main question will be the
availability and reliability of national-level data for developing countries. In
addition, this approach runs directly into the legal problem with basing taxes on
production techniques.
Yet another refinement would be to allow individual exporting firms to
provide information proving that they are below their national averages. A
particularly efficient firm, therefore, could get a lower border tax, creating an
incentive to shift to more efficient technologies.
Any border tax adjustment, whether based on importing country
information, exporting country information, or firm-level information, will
require significant information gathering, documentation, categorization, and
recordkeeping. Without border tax adjustments, a carbon tax could cover 80
percent of U.S. emissions by taxing around 3,000 companies and could cover an
even larger fraction without imposing a significant additional burden. Once we
have border tax adjustments, we would need records of carbon emissions from a
wide variety of activities. Dispute resolution mechanisms would be needed.
Because technology changes all the time, disputes would continue.
By way of analogy, consider how hard carbon footprint labeling has been.
The problem for determining proper border tax adjustments is essentially the
same. The tax, which looked so simple, suddenly becomes a very difficult
administrative exercise.
E. Summary
The above discussion leads us to the following conclusions. Border tax
adjustments may be necessary, but only for trade with countries without a carbon
price. Moreover, they are likely to be very complicated to administer and legally
suspect. Therefore, for trade within the set of countries with an adequate carbon
price, an origin basis system, (one without border tax adjustments), is preferable.
The major effect of this choice is to allocate carbon tax revenues to countries
producing carbon-intensive goods instead of to countries consuming carbon
intensive goods.
For imports from countries without an adequate carbon price, we most
likely would need to impose a border tax based on either of the two methods
discussed above to prevent leakage. Moreover, when combined with the originbasis system, it creates an incentive for these countries to impose a carbon price.
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By imposing a carbon price, they would effectively get the revenue that the U.S.
would otherwise receive because of the border tax. Limiting border tax
adjustments to the most carbon intensive goods and goods where the production is
particularly mobile might help reduce the administrative cost (although it would
increase the rent seeking costs as industries lobbied for border tax adjustments for
their industry).
A more difficult issue is whether to allow rebates for exports to these
countries. Not allowing rebates may significantly reduce the administrative
complexity of the system. The idea would be that we generally have an origin
basis system and do not allow rebates. We impose a border tax on import as only
a substitute for the carbon price that was not imposed in the producing country,
and this border tax on import does not warrant a corresponding rebate on export.
Without rebates on export, however, there would be an incentive to shift
production to countries without a carbon price to the extent that the goods are
consumed there. there. For example, suppose that a producer in the United States
is exporting a carbon intensive good to a country without a carbon price. If we do
not give a rebate of the carbon tax on export, the producer could shift the
production to the foreign country to avoid the tax. A second problem is that there
could be double taxes under certain circumstances: if raw materials subject to a
carbon tax are exported to a non-carbon pricing country where they are made into
final goods and imported into a country with a carbon price, there would be a risk
of imposing the carbon tax twice. Administering a system to prevent such double
taxation would be complex. Finally, a one-way system of taxes on import but not
rebates on export, might be harder to justify under the WTO. If these problems
are severe, we could offer rebates for exports to countries without a carbon price.
Like with imports, we could reduce administrative costs by limiting rebates to the
most carbon-intensive goods.
VI.

Interaction with Existing Domestic Taxes and Regulations

There are a large number of regimes in the U.S. that affect carbon
emissions, from various command and control regulations to incentives and taxes.
An important question in implementing a carbon tax is how it interacts with
existing rules. In this section, we offer a brief review of the relevant existing
regimes and a discussion of whether and how they would need to be modified if
the United States had a broad-based carbon tax.
We have already noted that the U.S. imposes a gas tax. We argued that
this should remain in place if a carbon tax is enacted on the basis that the gas tax
corrects for nonclimate change related externalities from driving.
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The major form of support for renewable energy production in the United
States is the system of production tax credits for renewable power enacted in the
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486). Production tax credits (PTCs) are
provided for qualifying facilities (wind power, biomass, and geothermal among
other sources) for ten years at a rate of 1.5¢ per kWh.50 PTCs have generally been
viewed as successful except for the uncertainty surrounding their Congressional
renewal every two years. Congressional delays have twice led to their temporary
expiration with a consequent fall in investment in the following year (see
discussion in Wiser, R. (2007)).
The role of production tax credits is to reduce the price of renewably
generated electricity relative to that of fossil or nuclear fueled electricity. A
carbon tax would also lower the price of non-fossil fuel generated electricity
relative to fossil-fuel generated electricity by raising the cost of the latter rather
than the PTC's subsidy to the former. A tax based approach has two advantages
over the PTC approach. First, the carbon tax raises the cost of electricity on
average while the PTC lowers it on average. The tax then provides an additional
mechanism to reduce carbon emissions by reducing overall demand for electricity
rather than stimulating it as the subsidy does. Second, the carbon tax creates a
price differential among fossil fuels based on their carbon content. Studies such
as Metcalf, G. E., S. Palstev, J. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby and J. Holak (2008) show
that an early response to carbon pricing is fuel substitution in the electric utility
industry to shift away from coal towards natural gas. These considerations all
suggest that the appropriate policy would be to eliminate production tax credits if
a carbon tax were enacted.
A second regulatory approach at the federal level is the mandating of
minimum fuel efficiency standards through the Corporate Average Fuel
Efficiency (CAFE) program. CAFE mandates fleet standards for automobiles and
light trucks. CAFE standards were significantly tightened in the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140) which will raise the fleet
average from the current level of 26.7 mpg in 2007 to 35 mpg by 2020.51
50

METCALF, G. E. (2007): "Federal Tax Policy toward Energy," Tax Policy and the Economy, 21,
145-184. describes federal energy tax policies in detail and provides a levelized cost analysis of
the benefit of these subsidies. CARLSON, C., and G. E. METCALF (2008): "Energy Tax Incentives
and the Alternative Minimum Tax," National Tax Journal, 61, 477-491. discuss the interaction
between energy credits and the corporate alternative minimum tax.
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Prior to the 2007 act, separate standards existed for automobiles and light trucks. In 2007 the
standards were 27.5 mpg and 22.2 mpg respectively with a realized fleet average of 26.7 mpg.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (2008): "Revised Summary of Fuel Economy
Performance," Washington, DC: NHTSA. for fleet efficiency data and CAFE standards.
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Ellerman, A. D., H. D. Jacoby and M. B. Zimmerman (2006) consider
how Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) standards could be integrated
into a cap and trade system and estimate that the cost of carbon emission
reductions through CAFE is in the neighborhood of $350 per ton of CO2
equivalent, considerably higher than estimates of permit prices under the
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 2191) (see Appendix D to Paltsev,
S., J. M. Reilly, H. D. Jacoby, A. C. Gurgel, G. E. Metcalf, A. P. Sokolov and J.
F. Holak (2007)). This estimate helps make two points. First, sector-based
regulatory policies that are not integrated more broadly into a carbon reduction
scheme can be very expensive. Second, the early reductions in carbon emissions
are likely to occur in industry and the electric utility industry rather than in the
transport sector. Since the source of emissions has no bearing on damages
associated with climate change, sector based approaches are likely to be quite
inefficient.52
At the sub-federal level, the number of state-level programs to control
greenhouse gas emissions or to encourage renewable energy programs is growing.
Thirty-two states have some form of renewable portfolio standard (RPS)
mandating a given percentage of electricity be provided by renewable sources.
DSIRE (2008)
RPS programs generally mandate that electricity distributors or retailers
must provide Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) for a given percentage or amount
of electricity sold by the facility. A qualifying renewable facility is provided a
number of RECs based on its electricity production that the facility may then sell
in a REC market to distributors or retailers needing RECs to match their power
sales. The sale of RECs provides a subsidy to renewable electricity generation
financed by utility customers and/or shareholders.
A slightly different approach to supporting renewable electricity
generation is through a Feed-in Tariff. A feed-in tariff requires utilities to
purchase power from qualifying facilities at a fixed rate (or premium) for a given
number of years. Feed-in tariffs differ from renewable portfolio standards in
setting a price for renewable electricity rather than a fixed amount of new
supply.53 They differ from production tax credits in two important ways. First
52

Other pollutants or market failures may provide a rationale for reducing oil consumption or
tailpipe emissions. This simply reflects the fact that multiple instruments are generally needed to
address multiple market failures.

53

In this sense the two instruments correspond to subsidy versions of price versus quantity
controls.
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they can be designed to provide a price guarantee rather than a fixed premium.54
This has two benefits. If the generation price of competing fossil fuel generators
falls, the FIT subsidy rises to maintain a fixed purchase price. This provides price
stability to investors. On the other hand, if competing generation prices rise, the
FIT phases out and so reduces the cost to rate payers. FITs differ from production
tax credits in a second important way. While PTCs are subsidized by the federal
government and subject to reauthorization every two years, FITs are subsidized
by rate payers. This may reduce politically motivated price volatility as has
occurred with PTCs in recent years.
RPS and FIT programs serve support renewable electricity generation.
Unlike the production tax credits, they raise the average price of electricity
thereby providing a demand side reduction in emissions. Unlike a carbon tax,
however, they are sectoral based policies and thus will not necessarily lead to the
equalization of marginal abatement costs across different sources of carbon, a
necessary condition for efficiency in carbon emission policy. An important
federalism policy arises with the adoption of a federal carbon tax. Should the tax
supplant these state-level policies or co-exist with them? For the RPS program, a
national carbon tax would reduce the value of RECs by the magnitude of the
carbon tax.55 As we discussed above with respect to the transition to a carbon tax,
governments should not engage in compensations for takings of this sort. For the
FIT program, the carbon tax would simply replace a portion (or all) of the FIT
subsidy. To see this, imagine that a natural gas power plant is the marginal fuel
source and costs 6¢ per kWh. A wind generator in contrast costs 9¢ per kWh.
The feed in tarrif would be 3¢ per kWh for the wind facility funded by ratepayers
of the utility purchasing the wind power. Now consider a carbon tax that raises
the cost of gas from 6¢ per kWh to 8.5¢ per kWh. The FIT automatically drops to
0.5¢ per kWh on the wind generated electricity.
A third regulatory regime of importance is the emerging carbon cap and
trade programs at the state or regional level. The two most significant to date are
the Northeast states' Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California's
54

Feed in tariffs (FITs) have been constructed to provide a price premium or a fixed price.
European FITs have generally been of the fixed price rather than premium type. See METCALF, G.
E. (2008): "Tax Policy Financing for Alternative Energy Equipment," Journal of Equipment Lease
Financing, 26, 1-7. for a discussion of European FITs and RICKERSON, W., F. BENNHOLD, and J.
BRADBURY (2008): "Feed-in Tariffs and Renewable Energy in the United States - a Policy
Update," Washington DC: Heinrich Boll Foundation. for a discussion of their possible use in the
United States..
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If the RPS program were abolished upon enactment of a carbon tax, the value of RECs would
go to zero.
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Global Warming Solution Act of 2006 (AB 32) which establishes a statewide
emissions cap in 2020 equal to 1990 levels. While the California Air Resources
Board (CARB), the agency tasked with implementing this law, has not yet
determined what instruments it will use to meet this goal, it is widely expected
that it will recommend a cap and trade system. The RGGI initiative builds on
state-level initiatives to cap emissions from the electric power sector in their state.
RGGI establishes a regional trading system to reduce costs among participating
states. In the first phase, it caps emissions at "current levels," by 2009. Current
emissions are defined as 188 million short tons of CO2, roughly 4 percent above
average regional emissions in 2000 to 2004. It would then reduce emissions
gradually to achieve a ten percent reduction from current levels by 2018.56
In addition to RGGI, the Midwestern Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction
Accord was established in November 2007 with six states and one Canadian
province participating. A separate Western Climate Initiative has recently set a
goal of a fifteen percent reduction below 2005 levels by 2020.57
A similar issue arises with regional or state-level cap and trade programs
as with RPS programs upon enactment of a carbon tax. If a federal tax must be
paid on emissions for which a state or regional permit is required, the value of the
permit will fall by the amount of the tax (or to zero, whichever is less). States
might argue that the carbon tax should not apply to emissions subject to state or
regional permits. This would be equivalent to carbon tax revenues being levied
on all emissions and rebated to holders of state or regional cap and trade permits.
This would be a mistake.
VII.

Conclusion

Most carbon pricing regimes are imposed on relatively narrow bases and
are imposed midstream, on industrial users of energy. Moreover, the trend seems
to be in the direction of a cap and trade system. We propose a different approach
here. For reasons long established in the literature, a carbon tax is preferable to a
cap and trade system. We show that a well-implemented carbon tax imposed
upstream can easily cover 80 percent of U.S. emissions and can likely cover
almost 90 percent with a modest additional cost. The benefits of the broad base
and lower compliance costs are likely to be significant.
56

See "Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Program" available at
http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf, accessed on May 27, 2008.
57

These regional initiatives are described at
http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/regional_initiatives.cfm, accessed
on May 27, 2008.
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